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The economic analysis of law evaluates legal regimes by the criterion
of social welfare, which economists usually take to be a function of the
utility that individuals enjoy under the laws in question. Economists
generally define the utility enjoyed by each individual as the satisfaction of
that individual’s preferences over various states of the world. Economists
normally assume that any reasonable notion of social welfare would
conform to the Pareto principle, which holds that if each individual prefers
one state of affairs over another, then social welfare must be higher in the
first state than in the other state.
Amartya Sen, in his influential article entitled The Impossibility of a
Paretian Liberal, shows how liberal rights, such as the right to read a book
of which others disapprove, can produce outcomes that everyone would
prefer to avoid, thereby violating the Pareto principle.1 Sen infers that one
cannot uphold both liberal values and the Pareto principle. Disturbed by the
implication that “ individual liberty may have to be revoked” under the
Pareto principle, Sen concludes that the conflict that he exposes indicates
“ the unacceptability of the Pareto principle as a universal rule.” 2
In a similar vein, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell identify potential
conflicts between the Pareto principle and notions of “ fairness,” which
give weight to considerations other than the overall utility level of each
individual.3 Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell claim that “ any conceivable
notion of social welfare that does not depend solely on individuals’
utilities” implies a “ social welfare function” that violates the Pareto
principle.4 They infer that “ as a matter of logical consistency, a person who
embraces a notion of fairness must on some occasions favor adopting legal
rules that would make every person worse off,” a conclusion that they view
as “ a serious challenge to proponents of notions of fairness who also care
about the well-being of members of society.” 5 We might call their claim
“ The Impossibility of a Fair Paretian.” Unlike Sen, however, Kaplow and
Shavell view their impossibility claim as a critique of all fairness notions
(including liberal rights) rather than of the Pareto principle as a universal
rule.

1. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970). The
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences cited Sen’s work on this issue as one of the contributions
justifying its award of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics to Sen. See Royal Swedish Acad.
of Scis., http://www.kva.se/eng/pg/prizes/economics/1998/ecoback98.pdf (last visited Sept. 24,
2000).
2. Amartya Sen, Liberty, Unanimity and Rights, 43 ECONOMICA 217, 235 (1976).
3. E.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of Fairness and the
Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63, 65-66 & n.5 (1999).
4. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, ANY NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIAL WELFARE
FUNCTION VIOLATES THE PARETO PRINCIPLE 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7051, 1999), forthcoming as Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of
Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. (2001).
5. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 76.
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That is, Kaplow and Shavell use their claim to advocate “ welfarism,”
which makes moral judgments a function only of the utility of individuals.6
Welfarism includes a broader class of moral theories than utilitarianism,
which takes social welfare in a given population to be equal to the sum of
individual utilities. A welfarist theory need not assume that social welfare
for a given population is equal to the sum of individuals’ utilities. Kaplow
and Shavell, for example, assume a more general social welfare function
that permits the distribution of a given amount of utility among individuals
to affect social welfare.7 Any form of welfarism, however, including
utilitarianism, ranks states of affairs entirely on the basis of utility,
regardless of other information about those states. Thus, the claims of Sen
and of Kaplow and Shavell both have important implications for the
fundamental normative question of what criteria we should ideally use to
evaluate laws or public policies.
Both Sen’s claim and Kaplow and Shavell’s claim refer to the “ weak”
version of the Pareto principle, which holds that if every individual prefers
any alternative x to another alternative y, then x is socially preferable to y.8
The “ strong” Pareto principle holds that if at least one individual prefers x
to y, and no one prefers y to x, then x is socially preferable to y.9 Thus,
under the strong Pareto principle, x may be socially preferable to y even if
all but one individual is indifferent between x and y. The strong Pareto
principle is the stronger condition insofar as it implies the weak Pareto
principle. That is, if the strong Pareto principle holds, then the weak Pareto
principle must also hold. If the weak Pareto principle holds, however, the
strong Pareto principle does not necessarily hold.
The weak Pareto principle is a relatively weak constraint on a social
welfare function. It is a “ weak form of welfarism,” in the sense that while
welfarism “ asserts that non-utility information is in general unnecessary for
social welfare judgements,” the weak Pareto principle “ makes non-utility
information unnecessary in the special case in which everyone’s utility
rankings coincide.” 10 Thus, if we believe in any welfarism in which social
welfare is an increasing function of each individual’s utility, including
utilitarianism, then this belief will imply that the weak Pareto principle
must hold. Kaplow and Shavell, however, make the surprising claim that
6. E.g., Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 468 (1979) (defining
“ welfarism” as the view that “ [t]he judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of
affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken as an increasing function of, the respective
collections of individual utilities in these states” ). Thus, welfarism rejects the relevance of
nonutility information. Infra note 22 and accompanying text.
7. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 65-66 n.5.
8. Id. at 65 n.3; Sen, supra note 1, at 153.
9. Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
1073, 1075 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986).
10. Amartya Sen, Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What’s Wrong with Welfare
Economics?, 89 ECON. J. 537, 549 (1979).
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the converse implication is also true: If we believe in the weak Pareto
principle, then we must also believe in welfarism.
The weak Pareto principle is also an appealing criterion. Even Sen, who
argues that the Pareto principle is unacceptable “ as a universal rule,”
concedes that “ there is something very central in the idea that preferences
unanimously held by members of a community cannot be rejected by that
community.” 11 Kaplow and Shavell infer that because “ most analysts who
accord importance to notions of fairness would not want to contravene the
unanimous preferences of the population,” they should find the conflict
between fairness and the Pareto principle “ troubling.” 12 After all, why
would one ever want to violate the Pareto principle? When we do so,
“ everyone is worse off, including any person of possible concern under a
notion of fairness.” 13 Anyone who urges us to follow a rule that requires us
to violate the Pareto principle is vulnerable to the charge of “ superstitious
‘rule worship,’” that is, “ the charge of heartlessness, in his apparently
preferring abstract conformity to a rule to the prevention of avoidable
human suffering.” 14 Why should we follow a fairness rule that requires us
to comply even when it serves no one’s interests? Kaplow and Shavell
conclude that “ fairness-based analysis stands in opposition to human
welfare at the most basic level” 15 and that we should therefore reject all
fairness theories and base social choices on individual utility alone.16
I argue in this Article that both Sen’s critique of the Pareto principle
and Kaplow and Shavell’s critique of fairness notions are based on
questionable assumptions. This Article proposes a middle course, which I
argue resolves the supposed conflicts while remaining faithful to both
liberal fairness principles and the Pareto principle. Thus, Kaplow and
Shavell cannot reject all fairness concerns by relying on the Pareto principle
alone, nor can Sen reject the Pareto principle by relying on liberal rights
alone. Both positions require stronger and more controversial assumptions
to prove their claims.
This Article outlines a moral theory that takes social welfare to be a
function of more than just individual utility. In this Article, however, I do
not defend a particular theory of fairness against all possible objections.
Specifying completely the precise content of a liberal theory of fairness is

Sen, supra note 2, at 235.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 64.
Id. at 73.
J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD
WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 6 (1973).
15. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS VERSUS HUMAN
WELFARE: ON THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL POLICY 47-48 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and
Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 277, 2000), forthcoming in 114 HARV. L. REV.
(2001).
16. Id. at 1, 454.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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an ambition well beyond the scope of this Article. This Article does not, for
example, present a defense of the Pareto principle as a universal rule.
Instead, I assume for the sake of argument that we believe in the Pareto
principle, because I am interested in exploring the logical implications of
that belief. In particular, I analyze whether this belief must invariably
produce a conflict with liberal notions of fairness.17 My goal is simply to
demonstrate that plausible theories of fairness, especially a liberal theory,
need not violate the Pareto principle. Thus, although Kaplow and Shavell
may present an effective critique of some theories of fairness, their critique
cannot reasonably be viewed as effective against all theories of fairness.
Part I of this Article presents a critique of welfarism from a liberal
perspective and proposes a liberal alternative to the utilitarian theory of
social welfare. I first discuss the conflict between classical utilitarianism
and liberal values and then describe how various economists and
philosophers, including Ronald Dworkin, have proposed modifying the
utilitarian notion of social welfare to incorporate liberal notions of fairness.
Drawing upon this literature, I outline the basis for a liberal notion of social
welfare. In particular, I take issue with welfarism’s indiscriminate inclusion
of all forms of satisfaction, including the satisfaction of racist or malicious
preferences, in the calculation of social welfare. I argue that a liberal theory
would exclude the satisfaction of such objectionable preferences from our
notion of social welfare.
Part II describes how these liberal fairness notions raise the possibility
of conflicts with the Pareto principle and sets forth the claims of Sen and of
Kaplow and Shavell in more detail. Section III.A defends a resolution of the
conflict between the principle of liberal rights and the Pareto principle that,
I argue, is faithful to both principles, contrary to the claims of Sen. Indeed, I
argue that a solution based on alienable rights flows naturally from familiar
liberal principles.
Section III.B then extends this solution to notions of fairness generally,
arguing that a plausible theory of fairness can conform to the Pareto
principle, contrary to the claims of Kaplow and Shavell. I argue that any
plausible fairness theory includes multiple principles and that any such
pluralistic theory must specify rules for when some principles take priority
over others. There is nothing to prevent a pluralistic fairness theory from
including the Pareto principle among its principles and giving the Pareto
principle priority over other principles. Such a theory would never violate

17. This analysis should be of interest even to those who do not believe that the Pareto
principle should apply to all social choices, as long as we can agree that there are at least some
choices to which we should apply the Pareto principle. This Article reveals that we can apply
fairness principles to those matters to which the Pareto principle is also applicable; that is, a belief
in the Pareto principle with respect to those questions does not commit us to a welfarist theory
regarding those issues.
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the Pareto principle but would still apply fairness principles when doing so
would not create a conflict with the Pareto principle. This fairness theory
would not stand in opposition to human welfare, because it would never
make everyone worse off. Fairness principles would only come into play
when they protect the interests of some person willing to invoke those
principles when preferences conflict. To invoke fairness in these contexts
does not reflect any lack of concern with human welfare. Rather, under
such a theory, fairness notions would go to the question of how we trade off
the welfare of some against the welfare of others. Fairness notions would
help determine the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens in
society.
Part IV sets forth and evaluates two examples of social welfare
functions that incorporate notions of fairness while remaining faithful to the
Pareto principle. I explore the features of these social welfare functions,
which retain the most important virtues of utilitarian social welfare
functions, such as transitivity and a complete ranking of alternatives, but do
not neglect fairness concerns. They also feature some drawbacks, but I
suggest that the advantages of such a solution would outweigh these
disadvantages. In particular, the proposed social welfare functions violate
certain conditions that social choice theorists sometimes impose on such
functions. I argue that these conditions are unduly restrictive because they
rule out plausible moral theories, including fairness theories that feature
alienable rights. Finally, Part V summarizes my conclusions.
I. THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIONABLE PREFERENCES
Critics of classical utilitarianism have relied on the existence of illiberal
or antisocial preferences to generate some of their most cogent objections to
utilitarianism. For example, Bernard Williams poses a hypothetical that
features a minority group despised by an intolerant majority of citizens,
who have such prejudices against this group that they find “ even the
knowledge of its presence” to be “ very disagreeable.” 18 If some propose to
remove this minority, “ a utilitarian calculation might well end up favouring
this step, especially if the minority were a rather small minority and
the majority were very severely prejudiced.” 19 This implication of
utilitarianism runs counter to ordinary moral intuitions, which would not
consider the “ benefits” of such a step to be a justification, regardless of the
relative sizes of the persecuted minority and the intolerant majority and of
the intensity of the prejudice of the majority. Thus, Williams asks “ whether

18. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at
75, 105.
19. Id.
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the unpleasant experiences of the prejudiced people should be allowed . . .
to count.” 20
Similarly, Sen criticizes any version of welfarism, which deems
information regarding “ different sources of utility and the motivation
underlying it” to be morally irrelevant.21 Sen argues that this
“ uncompromising rejection of the relevance of non-utility information”
makes welfarism “ a very limiting approach.” 22 To illustrate the point, Sen
asks us to compare two social states, y and z, in a hypothetical society with
only two individuals.23 In each of these states, person 1 has gained at the
expense of person 2, relative to a third state x, producing a net gain in total
utility in either state y or z over state x. Each individual enjoys the same
level of utility in state y as in state z. In state y, person 1 enjoys higher
utility because an egalitarian government has redistributed some of the
wealth enjoyed by person 2 in state x to person 1, who is poorer than person
2. In state z, however, person 1 enjoys higher utility because the
government allows him to torture person 2, and person 1 derives sadistic
pleasure from the suffering of person 2. Under welfarism, we must ignore
the nonutility differences between states y and z, including the malicious or
sadistic nature of the preferences satisfied in state z. Thus, we draw a moral
distinction between states y and z only by rejecting welfarism. For Sen,
welfarism’s claim that we must “ attach the same weight to a person’s
enjoyment of food or shelter or personal liberty as to his joy from torturing
is surely subject to critical questioning.” 24
A. The Utilitarian Response
R.M. Hare rises to the defense of utilitarianism by questioning the
relevance of “ fantastic cases” that critics of utilitarianism use as a “ trick”
to make the utilitarian “ look like a moral monster.” 25 He concedes that
under utilitarianism, “ if the Nazi’s desire not to have Jews around is intense
enough to outweigh all the sufferings caused to Jews by arranging not to
have them around, then . . . it ought to be satisfied,” 26 but he argues that
such hypotheticals are too fanciful to provide a legitimate test for a moral
20. Id.
21. Sen, supra note 6, at 478.
22. Sen, supra note 10, at 548. As Robert Goodin has noted, Sen’s use of the term “ nonutility information” here may be misleading, because “ information about why individuals want
what they want” is “ still very much information about individual utilities.” Robert E. Goodin,
Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 75, 76-77 (Jon Elster &
Aanund Hylland eds., 1986). Nevertheless, I use this term as Sen uses it.
23. Sen, supra note 10, at 547-48.
24. Sen, supra note 6, at 476.
25. R.M. Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 23, 31
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
26. Id. at 30.
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theory. After all, Hare responds, it is “ obvious” that “ no actual Nazis had
such intense desires.” 27
It is not “ obvious,” however, that the hypothetical requires a
“ fantastic” intensity of desire among the Nazis. We can simply increase the
number of Nazis and reduce the number of Jews in the hypothetical until
the benefits of “ ethnic cleansing” (or perhaps even genocide) exceed the
costs. Under utilitarianism, for any given intensity of satisfaction for each
Nazi and any given amount of suffering for each Jew, there must be some
ratio of Nazis to Jews that would be large enough to justify the policy in
question.28 Hare apparently believes that the necessary ratio would border
on “ fantasy,” 29 but given the intensity of violent ethnic hatreds we observe
in the world, it is not “ obvious” that such a ratio is necessarily “ fantastic,”
especially if we assume a very small number of victims.
Suppose Hare is correct, however, that we are at least unlikely to
encounter such cases in real life, and “ cases that are never likely to be
actually encountered do not have to be squared with the thinking of the
ordinary man, whose principles are not designed to cope with such cases.” 30
His principles “ are for use in practical moral thinking, especially under
conditions of stress,” not for use in “ highly unusual situations,” and “ have
to be general enough to be impartable by education.” 31 These ordinary
principles do not necessarily correspond to those that we would arrive at
“ by leisured moral thought in completely adequate knowledge of the facts,
as the right answer in a specific case.” 32 Thus, Hare argues, our ordinary

27. Id. Similarly, Hare observes that “ we are most unlikely, even if we give sadistic desires
weight in accordance with their intensity, to encounter a case in which utility will be maximised
by letting the sadist have his way.” Id. Kaplow and Shavell give a similar response to the problem
of objectionable preferences. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 416 (suggesting that “ the
gain to the sadist will be exceeded by the aggregate utility loss to others” ).
28. John C. Harsanyi, Problems with Act-Utilitarianism and with Malevolent Preferences, in
HARE AND CRITICS 89, 96 (Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988) (noting that if the ratio is
sufficiently large, then “ we will have to conclude that the social-utility maximizing policy will be
to kill all Jews” ).
29. R.M. Hare, Comments, in HARE AND CRITICS, supra note 28, at 199, 245. Hare also
suggests that “ in all actual cases” it is better “ to push our institutions in the direction of the
abandonment of harmful pleasures and desires, and hope that those who now indulge in them will
soon change their ways.” Id. at 246. Similarly, Kaplow and Shavell argue that “ adopting policies
that are contrary to the current preferences of some could produce a change in their preferences,
and, over the long run, social welfare may rise as a result.” KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 15,
at 416. Making the immorality of genocide contingent on the mutability of the intolerant
preferences of the majority, however, seems no more plausible than making it contingent on the
ratio of proponents to victims. Even if we were persuaded that these preferences are immutable,
such that liberal policies would not change the intolerant preferences of the majority, we would
still be inclined to oppose genocidal policies that would satisfy these preferences.
30. Hare, supra note 25, at 30.
31. Id. at 31.
32. Id. Similarly, J.J.C. Smart defends the utilitarian position that “ there are no pleasures
which are intrinsically bad,” including sadistic pleasures. Smart, supra note 14, at 26. Smart
explains that “ [o]ur repugnance to the sadist arises, naturally enough, because in our universe
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moral intuitions may lead us astray in “ highly unusual” cases. There are
two problems with Hare’s response.
First, while Hare might persuade us that our ordinary moral intuitions
may be mistaken in “ highly unusual” cases, he does not demonstrate that in
fact they are mistaken in the particular hypotheticals in question. Thus, if
after “ leisured moral thought,” we still find that we cannot attach the same
urgency to utilities arising from different sources, this intuition need not be
put down as the result of the inculcation of simple principles during our
“ moral education.” 33 That is, we still must address the question: What
answer does “ leisured moral thought” produce? For example, does Hare’s
premise that we should give “ equal weight, impartially, to the equal
interests of everybody” 34 necessarily imply that we must be sensitive only
to the intensity of an individual’s preferences and blind to the nature of
those preferences? Why not take into account not only the level but also the
source of utility for each individual?
Second, we can also produce less unusual cases that cannot be so easily
dismissed. For example, consider the following questions. Should the
satisfaction of racist preferences count as a legitimate reason to adopt
public policies that discriminate or segregate on the basis of race?35 Should
the satisfaction of xenophobic preferences count as a legitimate reason to
adopt immigration restrictions, to raise trade barriers, or to use military
force abroad against foreign nationals?36 Should the satisfaction of
homophobic preferences count as a legitimate reason to adopt laws that
discriminate against homosexuals? It does not seem unrealistic to imagine
marginal cases in which a decision to count the satisfaction of intolerant
preferences as a social benefit might tip the balance in favor of illiberal
policies. When we consider whether to adopt these policies, must we
indiscriminately include all types of satisfaction in the calculation of social
welfare?

sadists invariably do harm.” Id. at 25. Thus, our distaste for sadism merely reflects “ our distaste
for the consequences of sadism,” which the utilitarian has already taken into account. Id. at 26.
33. Sen, supra note 6, at 476.
34. Hare, supra note 25, at 26.
35. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a state cannot
deny a divorced mother custody of her child on account of her interracial remarriage. The Court
rejected the legal relevance of racial prejudice in society: “ Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” Id. at 433; see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits antimiscegenation
laws); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from enforcing racially restrictive covenants); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits laws that forbid blacks to reside in white
neighborhoods).
36. See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and
the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1210-21 (1997) (arguing that racist
and xenophobic preferences should not count as reasons to adopt immigration restrictions).
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B. Laundering Preferences
Robert Goodin proposes that we respond to the problem of
objectionable preferences by using “ input filters,” which “ work by
refusing to count certain classes of desires and preferences when
aggregating individual utilities.” 37 This response raises the question of
which preferences we should disregard and the related question of how we
justify this “ laundering of preferences.” 38 In particular, can we justify this
“ laundering” in terms consistent with a “ want-regarding” morality that
still calculates social welfare by “ respecting preferences” in some broader
sense?39
1. External Preferences
Ronald Dworkin proposes a framework for distinguishing between two
types of preferences: “ [T]he preferences of an individual for the
consequences of a particular policy may be seen to reflect . . . either a
personal preference for his own enjoyment of some goods or opportunities,
or an external preference for the assignment of goods and opportunities to
others, or both.” 40 He illustrates this distinction using an example of a state
law school that excludes blacks: “ A white law school candidate might have
a personal preference for the consequences of segregation, for example,
because the policy improves his own chances of success, or an external
preference for those consequences because he has contempt for blacks and
disapproves social situations in which the races mix.” 41 Thus, external
preferences may derive from ill will directed at members of particular racial
groups or from racist political theories. External preferences may also be
“ moralistic,” as when “ members of the community disapprove on moral
grounds of homosexuality, or contraception, or pornography, or expressions
of adherence to the Communist party” and want to prohibit these activities
as immoral.42
External preferences, however, need not be malicious, moral, or
political. Suppose a white man derives no utility from the plight of blacks.
Perhaps he even takes some pleasure from observing their success, but he
37. Goodin, supra note 22, at 78.
38. Id. at 81.
39. Id. at 77.
40. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234 (1977). Dworkin does not,
however, specify what counts as a “ good.” If we define “ good” broadly enough to include the
satisfaction of external preferences, then any external preference can also be described as a
personal preference. Therefore, to maintain the distinction between external and personal
preferences, Dworkin must have a narrower definition of “ good” in mind, perhaps a definition
restricted to the sensory or physical experiences of the holder of the preference.
41. Id. at 234-35.
42. Id. at 235, 275-76.
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takes still more pleasure from the success of other whites, with whom he
sympathizes or identifies more readily. These “ altruistic” preferences favor
some individuals over others in the allocation of scarce social resources or
opportunities, and Dworkin would also count these as external
preferences.43
Dworkin argues that “ the only defensible form of utilitarianism” would
“ fix only on personal and ignore external preferences.” 44 He explains that
“ the principal source of the great appeal that utilitarianism has had” is its
egalitarian treatment of “ the wishes of each member of the community on a
par with the wishes of any other.” 45 This treatment embodies the “ right to
equal concern and respect” that each individual enjoys under the “ liberal
conception of equality.” 46 To count external preferences, Dworkin argues,
would “ be a form of double counting” inconsistent with the liberal
egalitarianism supposedly embodied in utilitarianism:
If a utilitarian argument counts external preferences along with
personal preferences, then the egalitarian character of that argument
is corrupted, because the chance that anyone’s preferences have to
succeed will then depend, not only on the demands that the
personal preferences of others make on scarce resources, but on the
respect or affection they have for him or for his way of life. If
external preferences tip the balance, then the fact that a policy
makes the community better off in a utilitarian sense would not
provide a justification compatible with the right of those it
disadvantages to be treated as equals.47
The victim of these external preferences will suffer on account of not only
the personal preferences of those competing for scarce resources but also
the external preferences of those who have no personal interest at stake.
In what sense, however, is the counting of external preferences a form
of “ double counting” inconsistent with equal concern and respect?
Dworkin’s characterization is question-begging: The counting of external
preferences strikes us as “ double counting” only if we have already

43. Id. at 235.
44. Id. at 276. To give a satisfactory result in Hare’s genocide hypothetical, a liberal theory of
social utility would exclude the satisfaction of external preferences entirely rather than merely
discount this satisfaction by some factor. Otherwise, there would still exist some ratio of Nazis
to Jews that would imply that genocide would increase social utility. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
45. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 275.
46. Id. at 273.
47. Id. at 235. Bruce Ackerman takes a similar concept of neutrality to be fundamental in the
liberal state. This neutrality principle precludes anyone from justifying a legal regime by claiming
that “ his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens” or that
“ he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.” BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980).
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decided on other grounds that they should not count.48 Otherwise, as H.L.A.
Hart suggests, it would seem that the exclusion of external preferences is a
form of “ undercounting” that denies equal concern and respect for those
who hold those external preferences.49 How are we to choose between these
two different notions of what “ equal concern and respect” would entail?
Although I ultimately adopt Dworkin’s distinction between personal
and external preferences, I offer a critique of the reasoning that Dworkin
sometimes uses to justify the exclusion of certain preferences. In analyzing
the rationales for the exclusion of some preferences, it is useful to
distinguish more carefully between the various species of external
preferences, because we might exclude each type of external preference on
somewhat different grounds. I propose a modified version of Dworkin’s
framework that I argue is more faithful to the liberal ideals underlying
utilitarianism.
I do not present this framework as a complete moral theory, specifying
the appropriate treatment of every imaginable type of preference. My
objectives here are more modest. I intend merely to suggest that the
laundering of preferences is in general a plausible response to the problems
raised by welfarism, and to outline how one might justify this laundering
using liberal principles.
2. Political and Moral Preferences
The fundamental objection to external preferences goes to the
substantive content of those preferences, which themselves deny the equal
concern and respect that utilitarianism owes all individuals. Thus, Dworkin
argues that the utilitarian must reject such preferences because by their very
nature they contradict the egalitarian premise of utilitarianism:
Suppose the community contains a Nazi, for example, whose set
of preferences includes the preference that Aryans have more and
Jews less of their preferences fulfilled just because of who they are.
A neutral utilitarian cannot say that there is no reason in political
morality for rejecting or dishonoring that preference, for not
dismissing it as just wrong . . . . For utilitarianism itself supplies
such a reason: its most fundamental tenet is that peoples’
preferences should be weighed on an equal basis in the same scales,
48. Dworkin has explained that his claim of “ double-counting” was “ meant to summarize
the argument, not to make it.” RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 366 (1985).
49. H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 842 (1979); see also
C. Edwin Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REV. 381,
386 (1978) (suggesting that “ the egalitarian nature of utilitarian analysis would seem to be
corrupted not by counting all of people’s preferences but by favoring those with only a certain
type of preferences, i.e., personal preferences” and that “ ignoring [an] ‘external preference’
would appear to be ‘half counting’” ).
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that the Nazi theory of justice is profoundly wrong, and that
officials should oppose the Nazi theory and strive to defeat rather
than fulfill it. A neutral utilitarian is barred, for reasons of
consistency, from taking the same politically neutral attitude to the
Nazi’s political preference that he takes toward other sorts of
preferences.50
Dworkin’s argument here turns on the nature of the Nazi’s preference
as based on a political theory other than utilitarianism: “ Political
preferences, like the Nazi’s preference, are on the same level—purport
to occupy the same space—as the utilitarian theory itself.” 51 Thus,
the utilitarian cannot be neutral between Nazism and utilitarianism:
“ Utilitarianism must claim . . . truth for itself, and therefore must claim the
falsity of any theory that contradicts it. It must itself occupy, that is, all the
logical space that its content requires.” 52 This logic sweeps quite broadly,
because it requires the utilitarian to ignore all preferences that flow from
political and moral theories that are not utilitarian, including many that
appear to be egalitarian, such as the theory of justice proposed by John
Rawls,53 and are thus far more appealing than Nazism.

50. DWORKIN, supra note 48, at 362. In a similar spirit, Paul Brest declares that “ decisions
are irrational insofar as they reflect the assumption that members of one race are less worthy than
other people.” Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term— Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976). This assumption would represent a
defect in “ the process by which race-dependent decisions are made” providing a rationale for the
“ antidiscrimination principle” that is distinct from “ harmful results of race-dependent decisions.”
Id. Similarly, Larry Alexander classifies biases that “ rest on erroneous judgments of others’
inferior moral worth” as “ intrinsically immoral” preferences. Larry Alexander, What Makes
Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 149, 192 (1992). He distinguishes “ intrinsically immoral” preferences from those that are
“ extrinsically—contingently—immoral because of the effects on others of acting on those
preferences.” Id. at 194. Thus, like Dworkin, both Brest and Alexander would reject such
intrinsically immoral preferences as justifications for decisions even before we weigh the costs
that the satisfaction of these preferences imposes upon others.
51. DWORKIN, supra note 48, at 363.
52. Id. at 361.
53. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Some have proposed that we exclude a
narrower class of preferences. For example, Baker suggests that “ taking into account” external
preferences “ is not always inappropriate” but that “ counting these preferences when they deny
the inherent equality or worth of persons is improper.” Baker, supra note 49, at 403. Eric
Rakowski considers the suggestion that we exclude “ preferences attributable to the belief that
some persons are not entitled to equal moral consideration” but still count “ desires that are not
antiegalitarian,” but he concludes that this solution is “ unavailing” because other external
preferences are also problematic. ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 29 n.13 (1991). For example,
Alexander notes that other “ preferences based on moral ideals,” such as the belief that
heterosexuality is “ the only morally proper form of sexuality,” that “ the role of sex partner is
gender-specific as a matter of morality,” or that “ it is immoral for women to perform certain roles
and for men to perform certain roles,” need not entail a belief that “ men and women have
differential moral worth.” Alexander, supra note 50, at 164. Nevertheless, Alexander considers
these preferences to be “ intrinsically immoral.” Id. at 192.
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It may be an overstatement, however, for Dworkin to suggest that it is a
“ contradiction” for a utilitarian to count political preferences.54 After all, a
utilitarian may deny the truth of rival political theories and may even strive
to persuade others to give up these theories, while still regarding it to be the
moral obligation of a utilitarian to count the political preferences of others,
even as they persist in believing rival theories. Even as Kaplow and Shavell
criticize notions of fairness, for example, they advocate a welfarist theory
that credits the “ tastes for fairness” that people may have, just as this
theory would credit any other tastes.55 Dworkin observes that if
utilitarianism counts political preferences, “ then it will be, from the
standpoint of personal preferences, self-defeating,” because the outcome
“ will then not be, from that standpoint, utilitarian at all.” 56 This
utilitarianism, however, is “ self-defeating” only if it adopts “ the standpoint
of personal preferences.” If a utilitarian does not adopt this standpoint, then
in what sense is the outcome self-defeating?
The stance of welfarists like Kaplow and Shavell does not entail a
logical contradiction, but it can put the welfarist in the awkward position of
making some people worse off in terms of their personal preferences in
order to satisfy the external preferences of others who believe in a political
theory that the welfarist regards as false and strives to displace. This
approach makes optimal policies depend on the prevalence and intensity of
competing political beliefs, including those that might be unsound or prove
illogical upon reflection. The utilitarian becomes, in part, a political
pollster, asking what others believe to be true rather than identifying a truth
that is independent of the political opinions of others.57 This utilitarian
would seek to implement the views of others that are baseless or illconsidered from a utilitarian perspective, even if this implementation
satisfied their external preferences by sacrificing the personal interests of
those who do not share these views, simply because these views are
popular.
This stance may not be illogical, strictly speaking, but it certainly
makes for a utilitarianism that is curiously vulnerable to capture by
profoundly illiberal views. In this sense, Williams suggests that a utilitarian
who counts political preferences would be “ defeating his own view of
things” when he credits a moral or political theory that is “ from the

54. DWORKIN, supra note 48, at 361, 363.
55. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 75.
56. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 235.
57. Brian Barry suggests that such a utilitarian “ would seem rather eccentric to take account
of my judgment as an ingredient in his judgment about social welfare.” Brian Barry, Lady
Chatterley’s Lover and Doctor Fischer’s Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the
Problem of Objectionable Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note
22, at 11, 37.
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utilitarian point of view itself irrational.” 58 Thus, Williams suggests that the
utilitarian exclude such preferences “ on the principle that no pains or
discomforts are to count in the utilitarian sum which their subjects have just
because they hold views which are by utilitarian standards irrational.” 59 If
we adopt the principle suggested by Williams and exclude all political and
moral preferences as suggested by Dworkin, however, these exclusions
seem to sweep both too narrowly in some dimensions and too broadly in
others.
3. Altruistic and Antisocial Preferences
The exclusion of all political and moral preferences may still leave us
with other preferences that we may wish to exclude. The discriminatory
altruistic preferences that Dworkin classifies as external, for example, need
not reflect any moral or political beliefs at all. Such preferences may simply
flow from “ our tendency to sympathize most readily with those who seem
most like ourselves.” 60 Sen, for example, distinguishes between preferences
that derive from some effect on our own psychological welfare, such as
those based on our “ sympathy” for other people, and those that depend on
our political or moral “ commitments.” 61 The individuals who feel
sympathy for some and not for others need not be making any moral
statement but simply experiencing pleasure when the objects of their
sympathy experience pleasure. They may merely present their preferences
as tastes, as entitled to satisfaction under utilitarianism as any other. These
tastes would be no more political or moral than the tastes underlying the
personal preferences that Dworkin would have the utilitarian satisfy.62
For example, John Harsanyi also distinguishes between “ personal
preferences” and “ moral preferences” and uses only personal preferences
to arrive at the “ social utility” he seeks to maximize under his utilitarian
theory, but he includes altruistic preferences in the concept of “ personal
preferences.” 63 Most individuals’ personal preferences, he explains, “ will
not be completely selfish, but they will assign higher weights to their own
interests and to the interests of their family, their friends, and other personal
associates than they will assign to the interests of complete strangers.” 64
58. Williams, supra note 18, at 106.
59. Id.
60. Brest, supra note 50, at 8.
61. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 326-29 (1977). Williams uses the term “ commitments” in a
similar sense. Williams, supra note 18, at 112-13.
62. The preference for public policies that satisfy one’s own altruistic preferences might be
deemed political, but then personal preferences would be political in precisely the same sense.
63. John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND, supra note 25, at 39, 47, 54.
64. Id. at 47.
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These preferences fail to extend equal concern and respect to all, however,
and Dworkin would exclude them as external preferences from the
utilitarian calculation of social welfare.65
Thus, to avoid the sort of inconsistency that Dworkin and Williams
identify, the utilitarian would have to exclude not only preferences derived
from moral or political views, but also any altruistic preference that
discriminates among other individuals.66 This exclusion would prevent
sympathies that reflect nepotism or tribalism from influencing public
policy. The basis for excluding these preferences, however, cannot be that
they occupy the same “ logical space” or are “ on the same level” as
utilitarianism, because they are not political preferences. They do not
conflict with utilitarianism, because they do not assert the truth of any rival
moral or political theory.
Instead, we would exclude such preferences because they are, in a more
general sense, inconsistent with the perspective of the utilitarian. These
preferences are, by their very nature, incompatible with the egalitarian
premises of utilitarianism, so that counting such preferences would allow
partiality to infect the outcome.67 If the motivation underlying utilitarianism
is, as Hare puts it, to give “ equal weight, impartially, to the equal interests
of everybody,” then perhaps an “ ideal observer” committed to this
egalitarian ideal would refuse to consider any interest based on unequal
concern for others.68 Such an interest would not be the “ equal” of any other
personal preference, because like political or moral preferences, this interest
differs in kind from purely self-regarding preferences. Thus, the exclusion

65. More recently, Harsanyi has endorsed Dworkin’s claim that “ the very nature of utilitarian
ethics suggests the exclusion of all external preferences,” including altruistic preferences.
Harsanyi, supra note 28, at 98.
66. Thus, Yew-Kwang Ng argues that in order to avoid “ double or rather multiple counting,”
we should ignore “ concern for the welfare of others” in “ social evaluation.” Yew-Kwang Ng,
Utility, Informed Preference, or Happiness: Following Harsanyi’s Argument to Its Logical
Conclusion, 16 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 197, 199 (1999). Other economists have argued that
cost-benefit analysis should not include ethical or altruistic values. E.g., Paul Milgrom, Is
Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics, and the Contingent Valuation Method, in
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 417, 418-22 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993).
67. Brest, for example, concludes that decisions that reflect “ racially selective sympathy and
indifference,” that is, “ the unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition of
humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one’s own
group,” are “ unfair,” like “ those reflecting overt racial hostility.” Brest, supra note 50, at 7-8.
Brest explains that “ such treatment violates the cardinal rule of fairness—the Golden Rule.” Id. at
8. We can distinguish these inherently discriminatory preferences from purely self-regarding
preferences, which may advantage some individuals over others merely as an incidental
consequence of satisfying these preferences in a market economy. For example, “ a preference for
music advantages individuals born with musical talent,” and “ a preference for reading novels
advantages individuals born with literary talent.” KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 414
n.865 (noting that “ virtually any taste may have third-party effects that result in relative
advantages and disadvantages to other people” ). We can give weight to these purely selfregarding preferences, which are not “ intrinsically immoral.” Alexander, supra note 50, at 194.
68. Hare, supra note 25, at 26.
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of these external preferences would be faithful to the ideal underlying
utilitarianism.69
Using similar reasoning, Harsanyi endorses the exclusion of other
preferences from his definition of social welfare. He would exclude
“ antisocial preferences, such as sadism, envy, resentment, and malice”
from his concept of “ social utility.” 70 Like altruistic preferences, antisocial
preferences are other-regarding preferences that Harsanyi classifies as
personal preferences rather than moral preferences, but which Dworkin
would classify as external preferences rather than personal preferences.71
Unlike altruistic preferences, which reflect the utility some derive from the
happiness of others, these antisocial preferences reflect the disutility some
derive from the happiness of others, or the utility derived from the
unhappiness of others.
69. Rakowski has suggested that a utilitarianism that excludes external preferences “ forsakes
its motivating idea.” RAKOWSKI, supra note 53, at 26. The truth of this claim depends on what
one takes to be the “ motivating idea” of utilitarianism. The claim would be correct if this idea is
that “ whatever moral principles would be chosen by self-interested, risk-neutral individuals
ignorant of their own desires and abilities are justified.” Id. at 24; see John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal
Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953)
(deriving utilitarianism from such a premise). Kaplow and Shavell similarly “ consider contexts in
which all individuals are symmetrically situated before events arise that call for the application of
legal rules” to justify welfarism. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 68. This idea, however,
“ begs the question” of whether we should consider this particular hypothetical to be the
appropriate test for a moral theory. Barbara Fried, Can We Really Deduce Utilitarianism from the
Pareto Principle? 41 (Dec. 6, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
We can reject this idea as the basis for moral principles and substitute a different motivating idea.
If the motivating idea is instead an ideal observer committed to equal concern and respect for all
persons, then the exclusion of external preferences would be a means to implement, not abandon,
that idea.
70. Harsanyi, supra note 63, at 56; see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 83
(1981) (criticizing utilitarians who “ ascribe value” to “ envy and cruelty, because these are
common sources of personal satisfaction and hence of utility” ). Shavell also suggests in his earlier
work that “ illicit utility (such as would arise when a person batters another for pleasure)” may not
enter “ social welfare.” STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 160-61
(1987). Other economists make similar suggestions. E.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 87, app. at 99 (1982) (suggesting that an economic
analysis may exclude an “ illicit benefit” that an injurer enjoys from wrongful behavior); Alvin K.
Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289, 299
(1985) (suggesting that an economic analysis of the social value of criminal acts may discount
“ the criminal’s gain” from the crime); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78
J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (suggesting that when “ society has branded the utility derived
from [crimes] as illicit,” the “ gain to the offender” is not “ a gain to society” ).
71. Like Dworkin, others have suggested the exclusion of all other-regarding preferences
from consideration. E.g., Jean Hampton, Rational Choice and the Law, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 649, 671 (1992) (suggesting that to avoid “ unfairness,” the parties to an ideal social
contract would consider only “ self-concerned” preferences and exclude “ other-regarding
interests that could be either malicious (thus skewing the contract ‘unfairly’ against those who
were hated) or beneficent (thus skewing the contract ‘unfairly’ in favor of those who where
loved)” ); Peter J. Hammond, The Economics of Justice and the Criterion of Wealth
Maximization, 91 YALE L.J. 1493, 1499, 1501 (1982) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 70)
(arguing that counting antisocial preferences is “ ethically unacceptable” and suggesting that only
“ good” and “ self-interested” preferences should count, where “ good” is defined using “ ethical
criteria” to determine “ moral worthiness” ).
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How does Harsanyi justify this exclusion? Like Dworkin, Harsanyi
appeals to the ideals underlying utilitarianism: “ According to utilitarian
theory, the fundamental basis of all our moral commitments to other people
is a general goodwill and human sympathy.” 72 A preference that is itself
incompatible with this general benevolence deserves no weight:
[N]o amount of goodwill to individual X can impose the moral
obligation on me to help him in hurting a third person, individual Y,
out of sheer sadism, ill will, or malice. Utilitarian ethics makes all
of us members of the same moral community. A person displaying
ill will toward others does remain a remember [sic] of this
community, but not with his whole personality. That part of his
personality that harbours these hostile antisocial feelings must be
excluded from membership, and has no claim for a hearing when it
comes to defining our concept of social utility.73
Thus, only a preference that is consistent with the principle of universal
beneficence can give rise to a moral claim that obliges others to satisfy it.
In this sense, Goodin suggests that we justify the laundering of
preferences using “ reasons which are located in the logic of the social
decision process.” 74 From this perspective, the exclusion of preferences
follows from this logic, because “ our very choice of aggregating
preferences as a way of making social decisions carries consequences for
the kind of preferences that we can count.” 75 This type of reasoning allows
us to exclude external preferences while remaining “ within the wantregarding framework,” which takes the satisfaction of preferences to be the
basis for social choices.76
4. Personal Preferences Based on External Preferences
On the other hand, Dworkin seems to go too far in excluding all moral,
political, and altruistic preferences, for he would exclude even personal
preferences that derive from moral, political, or altruistic preferences.
Consider, for example, the preference of an ascetic who pursues austere
consumption patterns so as to conserve social resources for the use of
others. Dworkin argues that a preference “ for less of a certain good on the
assumption, or rather proviso, that other people will have more” would be
72. Harsanyi, supra note 63, at 56.
73. Id. Thus, Harsanyi endorses the use of a “ censored utility function” that excludes
antisocial preferences, because an ideal observer would have no “ moral sympathy” for such
preferences. JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN
GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 62 (1977).
74. Goodin, supra note 22, at 85.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 86.
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“ parasitic upon external preferences, in the shape of political and moral
theories, and . . . may no more be counted in a defensible utilitarian
argument than less attractive preferences.” 77 This suggestion implies that a
utilitarian social planner in theory should try to induce people holding this
preference to consume more of the good in question, in spite of their
preferences not to do so. From this standpoint, their consumption patterns
would be “ distorted” by their moral beliefs, and the social planner would
seek to “ correct” this distortion, so as to eliminate the “ deadweight loss”
flowing from their moral beliefs.
This “ moral distortion” in an individual’s behavior would present the
social planner with a prima facie reason to change the individual’s
behavior. That is, the planner would deem any reduction in this
“ distortion” to be a social benefit militating in favor of any policy that
produces such a reduction. For example, Dworkin’s suggestion implies that
if environmentalists derive satisfaction from devoting their time and effort
to recycling activities, due to their moral or political convictions, a
utilitarian should ignore this benefit that the environmentalists perceive as
the result of their labors and implement policies to reduce their recycling
efforts.
In fact, Dworkin’s suggestion supports the use of coercion to correct
these supposed distortions in people’s activities if the application of
coercive policies would eliminate these distortions at a sufficiently low
cost. Although we can presume that Dworkin does not intend to endorse
such policies, the notion of social welfare that he suggests in theory would
justify such policies.78 These attempts to correct “ moral distortions” in
people’s behavior, however, would violate the liberal view that “ decisions
about what people value should be left up to them.” 79
Harsanyi suggests that an attractive feature of a utilitarianism based on
personal preferences is its fidelity to “ the important philosophical principle
of preference autonomy,” which holds that “ in deciding what is good and
what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his
own wants and his own preferences.” 80 Similarly, Rawls argues that in a
77. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 277.
78. Kaplow and Shavell criticize Dworkin’s theory using similar examples, pointing to “ the
difference between an opera singer who performs for the money and one who would not be
induced to perform by the money alone but does choose to perform because of the pleasure of
pleasing an audience” and noting that “ under the posited theory, the latter singer should not be
permitted to perform.” KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 414 n.864.
79. W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 19, 33 (“ When estimating demand functions for fish prior to Vatican
II, no economist ever proposed removing Catholics because they were eating fish out of a sense of
duty.” ).
80. Harsanyi, supra note 63, at 55. Harsanyi also calls this idea “ [t]he principle of individual
self-determination,” HARSANYI, supra note 73, at 61, or “ the principle of acceptance, because it
requires us to accept each individual’s own personal preferences as the basic criterion for
assessing the utility . . . that he will derive from any given situation,” id. at 52.
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“ well-ordered society, . . . persons are left free to determine their good.” 81
We find the classic expression of this liberal principle in John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because,
in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. . . .
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.82
Harsanyi, however, does not endorse this liberal principle in the
absolute form expressed by Mill. Instead, Harsanyi allows for the
possibility of paternalistic intervention to promote a person’s own good as
long as we “ use his own preferences in some suitable way as our final
criterion in judging what his real interests are and what is really good for
him.” 83 Harsanyi explains that “ a person may irrationally want something
which is very ‘bad for him’” when “ his own preferences at some deeper
level are inconsistent with what he is now trying to achieve.” 84 Thus,
Harsanyi distinguishes between a person’s “ manifest preferences” and his
“ true preferences.” 85 Manifest preferences are “ actual preferences as
manifested by his observed behaviour, including preferences possibly based
on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless logical analysis, or on strong
emotions that at the moment greatly hinder rational choice,” whereas true
preferences are “ the preferences he would have if he had all the relevant
factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and
were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice.” 86 Harsanyi
argues that “ social utility must be defined in terms of people’s true
preferences rather than in terms of their manifest preferences.” 87 An
analysis of the merits and proper scope of this qualification of the principle
81. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 448.
82. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (Longmans, Green & Co. 1921) (1859).
83. Harsanyi, supra note 63, at 56.
84. Id. at 55.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. For example, Harsanyi suggests that we are justified in using a “ corrected utility
function” for an individual if we think that the individual “ would approve of this” correction if
“ made aware of the possibility that his actual preferences were based on factual mistakes and of
the likely costs of these mistakes to him.” HARSANYI, supra note 73, at 61-62.
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of preference autonomy is beyond the scope of this Article. To maintain a
focus on other issues, I assume that the preferences under discussion are
“ true” preferences in the sense described by Harsanyi, not “ manifest”
preferences based on mistaken beliefs regarding one’s “ true” preferences.88
Subject to this proviso, the principle of preference autonomy prohibits
intervention based on our disapproval of the choices others make between
satisfaction of their purely personal preferences and satisfaction of their
moral, political, and altruistic preferences. Thus, under “ classical liberal
doctrine,” it is “ when assessing the conduct of others” that we agree “ not
to take into account certain feelings,” such as “ an abhorrence for certain
religious or sexual practices,” which then “ have no weight” from the
standpoint of justice.89 To take these feelings into account in one’s own
personal preferences does not violate the liberal principle of equal concern
and respect for others. To impose these moral views on others against their
will, however, would violate that principle.
Thus, for example, if some prefer for moral reasons not to encounter
pornography, then this preference would be a legitimate reason to restrict
the public display of pornography, as long as these reasons “ emphasize not
how others should lead their lives, but rather the character of the sexual
experience people want for themselves.” 90 To the extent that we count such
moral preferences only as they affect personal preferences and not as
external preferences, we can remain faithful to the liberal principle of equal
concern and respect. Thus, to uphold the liberal ideals underlying
utilitarianism, we must exclude external preferences, but we need not
exclude all personal preferences that derive from moral or political views. It
is only when moral and political preferences intrude into the external realm
that utilitarianism risks undermining its own ideals by seeking to satisfy
these preferences.

88. Similarly, Kaplow and Shavell assume that “ individuals understand fully how various
situations affect their well-being,” so that their arguments apply to “ individuals’ actual well-being
rather than to individuals’ well-being as reflected in their mistaken preferences.” Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 3, at 65 & n.2. I discuss the implications of the distinction between manifest
and true preferences when this issue becomes relevant. Infra note 153.
89. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 450. Similarly, Richard Epstein argues that “ no one person
is entitled to elevate his or her beliefs about how others should act above those of anyone
else.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 415 (1992) (emphasis added). Yet he otherwise seems to favor a
calculation of costs and benefits that does not require us “ to ask whose preferences are legitimate
and whose are not.” Id. at 43.
90. DWORKIN, supra note 48, at 364-65. Dworkin would allow such preferences to justify
regulations on public displays of pornography, but it seems he does so only because it is
impossible to separate those preferences “ that express moral condemnation or would not exist but
for it” from “ the remaining strands” of personal “ taste[s].” Id. at 356.
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C. Liberal Consequentialism
Once we exclude external preferences, we are left with a form of
utilitarianism that resists corruption by illiberal preferences and remains
faithful to the motivating ideals that give this philosophy much of its
appeal. Dworkin’s liberal principle of “ equal concern and respect”
embodies these ideals, which include the principles of universal
benevolence and of preference autonomy as described by Harsanyi and
Mill. Thus, we can use these liberal principles as the basis for a theory of
preference laundering.
Our theory is, however, no longer “ utilitarian” or even “ welfarist” as
Sen uses these terms, because it takes the source of utility, and not just its
quantity, to be morally relevant. Our philosophy remains a form of
“ consequentialism,” because it claims that policies “ are to be chosen on
the basis of the states of affairs which are their consequences.” 91 It is also
“ teleological,” insofar as it defines what makes states of the world “ good,”
then seeks to maximize “ the good.” 92 We have defined the good as a
particular notion of social welfare, one that uses nonutility information
about preferences as well as information about each individual’s level of
utility.
Under this theory, liberal rights, such as the right to read books of
which others disapprove, are derived from our theory of the good.93 We
design these rights as institutions that are likely to maximize our chosen
definition of social welfare. For example, Dworkin defends such rights as a
response to the problem of excluding external preferences in a democracy
that “ cannot discriminate, within the overall preferences imperfectly
revealed by voting, distinct personal and external components.” 94 We may
invoke “ rights to certain liberties like the liberty of free expression and of
free choice in personal and sexual relations” as trumps over the preferences
of a political majority, because this arrangement enables us “ to enjoy the
institutions of political democracy, which enforce overall or unrefined
utilitarianism, and yet protect the fundamental right of citizens to equal
concern and respect by prohibiting decisions that seem, antecedently, likely
to have been reached by virtue of the external components of the
preferences democracy reveals.” 95

91. Introduction to UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 25, at 1, 3-4 (emphasis
omitted).
92. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 24 (defining a teleological theory as a theory that holds that
“ those institutions and acts are right which of the available alternatives produce the most good” ).
93. Other theories, like the theory of justice advanced by Rawls, are “ deontological”
theories, which do not design rights to maximize some good specified in advance. Id. at 30.
94. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 276.
95. Id. at 277.
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This liberal theory of social welfare provides a firmer foundation for
such rights than does the welfarism of Kaplow and Shavell, who suggest
that “ rights of individuals against the government” may “ be embodied in
rules in order to constrain the behavior of agents who cannot be trusted to
use their discretion to maximize social welfare.” 96 For Kaplow and Shavell,
the satisfaction of external preferences would count as part of social
welfare.97 From a liberal perspective, even government agents who
faithfully maximize that notion of social welfare are a source of concern.
Thus, liberal rights are valuable precisely because they are effective against
government intrusions that do maximize Kaplow and Shavell’s concept of
social welfare.
II. THE CONFLICT WITH THE PARETO PRINCIPLE
The liberal consequentialism that we have outlined introduces
“ fairness,” as Kaplow and Shavell use the term, into the analysis. Kaplow
and Shavell define “ fairness” to include any “ method of policy
assessment” that gives any weight to “ characteristics of the situation that
will prevail under a legal regime” other than their effects on each
individual’s level of overall utility.98 Thus, “ fairness” includes “ principles
that are based on factors that matter to individuals but under which the
factors are weighed differently from the manner in which individuals
themselves weigh them.” 99 A liberal measure of social welfare that gave no
weight to external preferences, for example, would give less weight to such
preferences than the individuals themselves would give them. This liberal
measure of social welfare would thereby introduce some nonutility
information (that is, the “ external” nature of the preference) as a morally
relevant consideration. Kaplow and Shavell make the strong claim that
“ any conceivable notion of social welfare” that is a function of anything
but each individual’s utility level is a “ social welfare function” that “ will
sometimes require adoption of a policy that makes every person worse off,”
in violation of the Pareto principle.100
A. Sen’s Example
Would the liberal consequentialism sketched in Part I violate the weak
Pareto principle? We can show how it would using a simple example made
96. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 5.
97. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 411-17 (arguing in favor of including all
preferences, including objectionable preferences, in the calculation of social welfare).
98. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 66 n.5.
99. Id. at 65 n.4.
100. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 1.
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famous by Sen.101 Imagine a society with two individuals: The first is a
prude (P), and the second is lewd (L). There is one copy of a book, say
Lady Chatterley’s Lover, that each may read. The prude, P, has a personal
preference not to read the book, while lewd L’s personal preference is to
read the book. If we count only personal preferences, then the social
optimum is for L to read the book and P not to read the book. Let l denote
this state of affairs.
Suppose, however, that each person also has external preferences. The
prude, P, would prefer that L not read the book, because the thought of L
enjoying the book distresses P, and L prefers that P read the book, because
he would enjoy the thought of P’s discomfort and shock in reading the
book. In fact, each person’s external preference is so intense that each
would rather satisfy this external preference than his own personal
preference. Therefore, each would prefer an alternative in which P read the
book and L did not rather than the supposed social optimum. Let p denote
this alternative, which each person would prefer over l. Although l ranks
higher than p if we count only personal preferences, l is also “ Pareto
inferior” to p and thus not Pareto optimal.102 Thus, a social welfare function
that counts only personal preferences would violate even the weak Pareto
principle.103
Sen uses a different notion of liberalism and thus states the problem in a
somewhat different form. He assumes that we believe in “ [l]ibertarian
values,” which require that society respect each person’s desires in that
person’s “ personal domain” or “ protected sphere.” 104 Thus, in Sen’s
example, each person enjoys a libertarian right to decide whether to read
the book in question. Sen asks whether we can respect both these libertarian
rights and the Pareto principle over an “ [u]nrestricted [d]omain,” that is, if
we allow for every “ logically possible” set of preferences that individuals
could have.105 He shows that if we grant individuals libertarian rights, then
the result conflicts with even the weak Pareto principle.
Consider three possible alternatives in Sen’s example: In addition to
alternatives l and p, there is alternative o, in which nobody reads the book.
On libertarian grounds, we must prefer l over o, because L prefers to read
101. Sen, supra note 1, at 155.
102. Id.
103. Note that we define the Pareto principle based on what individuals actually prefer,
including not only their personal preferences but also their external preferences. If we were to
define the Pareto principle based on personal preferences only, then the conflict with liberal
consequentialism would disappear. I argue, however, that a liberal theory of social welfare should
respect a Pareto principle based not only on personal preferences but also external preferences.
Infra Part III.
104. Sen, supra note 6, at 479-80. Sen uses the term “ liberalism” for this concept in his
original article. Sen, supra note 1, at 153-54. In subsequent writings, Sen replaces this “ more
ambiguous” term with “ libertarianism.” Sen, supra note 2, at 218.
105. Sen, supra note 1, at 153.
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the book, and we must also prefer o over p, because P prefers not to read
the book. Yet the Pareto principle requires us to prefer p over l, in accord
with the unanimous preferences of P and L, which make p “ Pareto
superior” to l, thus completing a strict “ preference cycle.” 106 In this
“ Pareto-libertarian cycle,” p is strictly better than l, which is strictly better
than o, which is strictly better than p.107 These strict preference cycles imply
that we cannot identify the optimal social choice, and thus a theory of social
welfare that produces such a cycle does not satisfy what theorists normally
consider a basic requirement for social welfare functions.108
B. The Horns of the Dilemma
Sen infers that “ in a very basic sense liberal values conflict with the
Pareto principle,” which “ can have consequences that are, in fact, deeply
illiberal.” 109 He states the dilemma as follows: “ If someone takes the Pareto
principle seriously, as economists seem to do, then he has to face problems
of consistency in cherishing liberal values . . . .” 110 For Sen, the
“ impossibility” of a Paretian liberal “ points towards a serious questioning
of the Pareto principle” or at least of the “ mechanical use of the Pareto rule
irrespective of context.” 111 He concludes that we should not follow the
Pareto principle in all cases. Instead, he insists that in some cases, “ the
optimal solution involves waiving the Pareto principle.” 112 At least
sometimes, Sen suggests, we should refuse to implement a Pareto
improvement if it is based on illiberal preferences.
Others who have considered Sen’s problem have gone further than Sen
in the direction of libertarianism. Robert Nozick, for example, concludes
that we should always give libertarian rights priority over the Pareto
principle. He argues that individual rights should be viewed as constraints
on all social choices:
[E]ach person may exercise his rights as he chooses. The exercise
of these rights fixes some features of the world. Within the
constraints of these fixed features, a choice may be made by a
social choice mechanism based upon a social ordering; if there are
any choices left to make! . . .

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Sen, supra note 2, at 218.
Sen, supra note 10, at 550.
See, e.g., Sen, supra note 9, at 1079 (discussing the requirement of “ acyclicity” ).
Sen, supra note 1, at 157.
Id.
Sen, supra note 2, at 219.
Id. at 226.
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. . . How else can one cope with Sen’s result?113
For Nozick, social choices may be guided by a “ social ordering,” which
may well comply with the Pareto principle, but our social choices must
never violate individual rights.
Others are inclined to solve Sen’s problem by giving priority to the
Pareto principle rather than liberalism when the two come into conflict.114
Kaplow and Shavell, however, draw far more sweeping implications. They
address the more general conflict between any fairness notion (including
libertarian rights or the use of any other nonutility information) and the
Pareto principle, which they are inclined to resolve in favor of the Pareto
principle. They view this conflict as “ a serious problem for proponents of
notions of fairness.” 115 They claim that to follow any fairness principle will
make everyone worse off in at least some cases, so that “ as a matter of
logical consistency,” the advocate of fairness must sometimes “ choose
legal rules that hurt everyone.” 116 This result, in their view, makes it
problematic to “ give any weight in normative analysis to notions of
fairness.” 117 That is, they infer that fairness principles should never enter
our normative analysis of legal regimes, even in cases where the Pareto
principle is not at stake: “ Belief in the Pareto principle not only rules
out . . . Pareto-dominated policies; it also renders inadmissible certain
criteria for assessing policy.” 118 Kaplow and Shavell conclude that we
should reject all fairness principles. Thus, they would include any utility
valued by the individual, including external preferences, in their social
welfare function, much as a utilitarian like Hare would.119
III. A LIBERAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT
Do we really confront such a stark choice between the Pareto principle
and liberal rights? Must we in fact reject all fairness principles, including
principles of liberal toleration, in order to avoid violations of the Pareto
principle? Is there a solution to Sen’s problem? Such a solution seems

113. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 166 (1974) (emphasis omitted).
114. E.g., Peter Bernholz, Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible?, 20 PUB. CHOICE 99, 106
(1974) (“ The only . . . conclusion which can . . . be drawn from Sen’s proof is that there are
situations in which other decision rules than liberalism should be applied.” ).
115. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 64.
116. Id. at 76.
117. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
118. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 4; see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 72
(arguing that the Pareto principle “ has powerful implications for what criteria for making policy
choices one can consistently employ” even if it “ may not directly determine policy choices in
most real situations” ).
119. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 411-17 (arguing in favor of including all
preferences, including objectionable preferences, in the calculation of social welfare).

CHANGFINAL.DOC

200

NOVEMBER 9, 2000 11/9/00 9:27 PM

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 110: 173

imperative if we are to uphold liberal values without coming into conflict
with the unanimous preferences of the population. In the discussion that
follows, I describe a solution proposed in the prior literature and then
defend it against Sen’s responses.
A. The Possibility of a Paretian Liberal
Allan Gibbard proposes a solution to Sen’s problem of the Paretian
liberal.120 Rather than qualifying the Pareto principle, Gibbard modifies
Sen’s libertarian rights so as to avoid a conflict with that principle. He
argues that Sen has adopted an unreasonable notion of libertarian rights.121
His solution is to make these rights alienable, so that when it would make
everyone (including all those who hold these rights) better off to waive
these rights, then the Pareto principle would prevail.122
Consider Sen’s example, in which the supposedly liberal outcome (l) is
for L to read the book and for P not to read the book. If both L and P would
prefer P rather than L to read the book, and both can agree to waive their
rights, then L and P would prefer to enter a contract in which P agreed to
read the book and L agreed not to read the book. Once L and P are free to
trade their rights, then Pareto inferior outcomes will not be an equilibrium.
If there is a Pareto superior outcome, then the parties can bargain to move
to the Pareto optimum. It is in this sense that “ the Pareto criterion has been
thought to be an expression of individual liberty.” 123
To ensure the supposedly liberal outcome l, a rule would need to
prevent L and P from trading their rights as they see fit. Thus, Russell
Hardin declares that Sen is “ transparently wrong” to regard p as an illiberal
outcome, because “ it is obvious that among the most important of all rights
in the liberal canon are the right of exchange and its correlative right of
contract.” 124 Similarly, Brian Barry suggests that Sen’s notion of liberalism
is “ antithetical to a conception of liberalism that emphasizes the freedom
of individuals to make their own choices with as few constraints as
possible.” 125
Given the “ strong libertarian tradition of free contract,” Gibbard argues
that it may seem “ too paternalistic” for a rule to keep parties from striking
“ bargains to which everyone would agree.” 126 Why should a libertarian
120. Allan Gibbard, A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim, 7 J. ECON. THEORY 388, 401-06
(1974).
121. Id. at 397.
122. Id. at 400-01.
123. Sen, supra note 1, at 157.
124. RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 109 (1988).
125. Barry, supra note 57, at 19.
126. Gibbard, supra note 120, at 397. We may, however, believe in a version of liberalism
that can justify such paternalistic interventions when parties would make choices that would not
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interfere with such a contract between consenting adults? One may
disapprove of their motives, but if no one is harmed by the contract, then it
would seem consistent with liberal principles to deem their motives to be
their own business. Thus, Gibbard suggests, “ a libertarian may want to
allow the parties to bargain.” 127 To do otherwise smacks of illiberal
paternalism, because trying to protect the parties from their own
preferences would violate the liberal principle of preference autonomy. If
liberal principles require that social choices respect decisions not only to
exercise libertarian rights but also to waive them, then we can escape from
Sen’s dilemma. Gibbard concludes: “ A libertarian can consistently hold the
Pareto principle and still claim that in a strong sense, everyone has
rights.” 128
1. Sen’s Responses
Sen objects to Gibbard’s solution, because it allows external
preferences to outweigh personal preferences and would always give the
Pareto principle priority over liberal rights:
When meddling in each other’s affairs causes a cycle involving the
Pareto principle and personal rights, the axe in the Gibbard system
falls invariably on personal rights (based on the “ self-regarding”
part of a person’s preference), leaving intact the effectiveness of the
Pareto rule (based on the “ non-self-regarding” parts of people’s
preferences).129
“ To axe invariably personal rights . . . and never the Pareto principle, when
they conflict,” seems to Sen “ hard to justify.” 130 Gibbard’s approach,
however, would give external preferences priority over personal
preferences only insofar as these preferences are held by the same person,
who gives these external preferences such priority in his own hierarchy of
values. If we show a liberal respect for preference autonomy, then it is
exactly in such cases that the Pareto principle should prevail over Sen’s
libertarian rights.
Sen also observes that P and L may not trade, because such a contract
would be difficult to enforce. Specifically, L “ may not be able to ensure
that the prude will, in fact, read the book once it has been handed over to

satisfy their “ true” preferences. For a discussion of such constraints on individual choice, see
infra note 153.
127. Gibbard, supra note 120, at 398.
128. Id. at 406.
129. Sen, supra note 2, at 224.
130. Id. at 226.
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him.” 131 In a similar vein, others have noted practical problems in
implementing Gibbard’s solution.132 All of these problems, however,
merely suggest that the solution would be difficult to achieve as a matter of
public policy. These objections go to the “ pragmatic” question of whether
the solution is feasible, not to the “ ethical” question of whether the trade
would be socially desirable if it were available to us as a social choice, and
it is the ethical question that is relevant for our purposes here.133 As Sen
concedes, the failure of a trade to take place due to these types of
difficulties does not imply that it would not have been good for social
welfare if it had taken place.134 These pragmatic objections point to possible
“ constraints” on the outcomes that the social planner can achieve, but they
do not tell us how to choose the “ objectives” that the social planner should
pursue.135
Finally, Sen introduces political commitments into his example and
suggests that P or L may not want to trade, because they may be committed
libertarians who “ see no moral gain in the ‘trade.’” 136 If one of them has
libertarian convictions, these political beliefs may prevent one party from
satisfying those other-regarding preferences that militate in favor of the
trade. If one party refuses to trade on political grounds, however, then P
reading the book (p) is no longer Pareto superior to L reading the book (l).
If we introduce these political commitments and take account of the weight
that P and L give their beliefs in libertarian rights, then all things considered
they do not unanimously prefer p over l, because the decision not to trade
reveals a contrary preference. If p is not Pareto superior to l, then it does not
violate the Pareto principle for society to rank l over p on libertarian
grounds.
2. Utility as Happiness
A decision by either party not to transact would reveal a preference for l
over p, and we might infer from this “ revealed preference” that L and P do

131. Sen, supra note 6, at 482 n.35.
132. E.g., Kaushik Basu, The Right To Give Up Rights, 51 ECONOMICA 413 (1984)
(exploring problems of incentives under any system in which individuals waive their rights
voluntarily); Edi Karni, Collective Rationality, Unanimity and Liberal Ethics, 45 REV. ECON.
STUD. 571 (1978) (showing how Gibbard’s solution may be manipulated by parties who cheat);
Jerry S. Kelly, Rights Exercising and a Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim, 13 J. ECON.
THEORY 138 (1976) (exploring difficulties parties would encounter in deciding when to waive
their rights).
133. Sen, supra note 2, at 224.
134. Sen, supra note 10, at 552 n.2.
135. Peter J. Hammond, Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND, supra note 25, at 85, 86 (noting that “ many common misconceptions have arisen
because of a confusion of objectives and constraints” ).
136. Sen, supra note 10, at 551.
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not both enjoy higher utility in p than in l, but Sen resists this inference.137
He seeks to define utility “ in the traditional sense of happiness, or in the
sense of a person’s own conception of his well-being” rather than in terms
of revealed preference.138 Sen claims that L and P may still both be happier
in p than in l, even if they would not both choose p over l. Therefore, the
libertarian outcome l would still violate the Pareto principle, if we deem p
Pareto superior to l based on “ a unanimous utility ranking” rather than by a
unanimous preference revealed by choice, so that a refusal to trade would
still be a refusal to apply the Pareto principle “ without qualification.” 139
Thus, in order to maintain a conflict with the Pareto principle, Sen must
depart from economic traditions in two respects. First, he must distinguish
between utility and revealed preferences. Second, he must make his
definition of the Pareto principle more specific so that it turns on utility
levels rather than on preferences that would be revealed by choice.140 That
is, he gives the notion of “ individual preference” a “ desire interpretation”
rather than a “ choice interpretation.” 141 In effect, he defines utility to
exclude preferences based on political commitments, so that P or L can
reveal a preference for l over p through their decision not to enter a
contract, even if p gives them more utility than l. Thus, as long as “ people
attach some importance to minding their own business, then that odd
contract need not in fact materialize.” 142
It seems, however, that we must include these political commitments in
our definition of utility to generate a Pareto principle we would feel an
obligation to uphold. If P and L do not trade, because one of them wants to
uphold libertarian values, then it does not seem disturbing if they fail to
trade. If L, for example, is a libertarian who chooses to place more weight
on his libertarian political commitments than his other external preferences,
then it would seem illiberal for anyone (say P, who wants to trade) to
question L’s choice by pointing to the utility that L would enjoy if L and P
were to trade. Under the principle of preference autonomy, it seems that this
utility is for L to enjoy or to refuse to enjoy as L sees fit. If L reinforces his
137. Id. at 551-52.
138. Id. at 552.
139. Id. Thus, whether the refusal to trade is “ a violation of the Pareto principle or a
consistent application of it depends on whether one regards an individual’s liberal values as a part
of his preferences or a constraint upon them.” DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 404
(1989).
140. Sen uses the term “ conditional Pareto principle” to describe a Pareto principle that is
based on preferences that are conditional on political preferences as well as all other preferences.
Sen, supra note 2, at 236. He distinguishes this Pareto principle from “ Pareto preferences in the
traditional sense,” by which he means preferences based on happiness. Id. at 237. It might be
equally accurate, however, to refer to the “ conditional Pareto principle” as the “ traditional”
principle, because the “ conditional Pareto principle” turns simply on what outcomes individuals
actually prefer, all things considered.
141. Amartya Sen, Minimal Liberty, 59 ECONOMICA 139, 145 (1992).
142. Id.
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personal desire to read the book with a libertarian political commitment,
then we might deem it to be L’s prerogative to base his personal preference
in part on a moral preference.
It robs the Pareto principle of its moral force if one or both of the
supposed beneficiaries of the Pareto improvement would prefer, all things
considered, to forego the benefit. Thus, it seems one might well accept this
violation of Sen’s desire-based Pareto principle without qualms, and the
supposed conflict with this desire-based Pareto principle does not then
amount to much of a paradox.143 As long as L has these political
commitments, a liberal respect for L’s preferences requires others to respect
L’s refusal to trade, although they may seek to persuade L that these
political views are mistaken.
We can make the dilemma more forceful if we take the question to be
whether L should choose to trade with P if L believes in liberal values
rather than whether others must respect L’s decision on this issue. Sen
claims that “ the dilemma of the Paretian liberal remains” in the form of a
“ dilemma of personal behaviour.” 144 If L expresses qualms based on the
contract’s interference with P’s right not to read the book, however, then P
might respond that the reasons for L’s hesitation fail to respect the principle
of preference autonomy, because P seeks to waive the right that L wants to
preserve on P’s behalf. As a liberal, then, L would have to base his
objection to the trade on his own desire to be free to read the book, despite
his stronger desire to get P to read the book. Sen’s view of liberalism, for
example, prescribes the “ good liberal practice of reading what one likes
and letting others read what they like,” even in the face of a unanimous
desire to do otherwise.145 For L to assume that a liberal principle requires
him to refrain from the trade that P proposes, however, begs the question: Is
that interpretation of liberalism correct? Perhaps L should declare, as Barry
does, “ I simply deny that there is any such liberal principle.” 146
This question brings us back to the most important issue that Gibbard’s
suggestion raises: What does liberalism actually require? Barry responds
that liberalism is “ a principle that picks out a protected sphere, but one that
is protected against unwanted interference, not against use in trading with
others.” 147 Thus, this narrower interpretation of liberalism would never
143. Furthermore, if this particular conflict is all that Sen wants to illustrate, then he can do
so using a much simpler hypothetical. It would be sufficient to consider a society of one person
who would enjoy reading a book but refrains from doing so in order to comply with a moral
commitment. In this case, the desire-based Pareto principle would regard reading the book as the
better outcome, but a liberal respect for her right not to read the book would suggest the reverse
ranking.
144. Sen, supra note 141, at 146.
145. Id. at 145.
146. Barry, supra note 57, at 14.
147. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Sen complains that “ Barry supposes that the only barrier to
such contracts can arise from people not being allowed to enter into such contracts,” whereas
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require L to violate the Pareto principle, because it would always allow
parties to trade their rights. If L adopts this view of liberal rights, then
perhaps L should have no qualms about trading. The lesson we draw from
Gibbard’s suggestion is that the Pareto principle does not imply, as Sen
suggests, that “ individual liberty may have to be revoked.” 148 If the Pareto
improvement does not entail the “ deeply illiberal” outcome feared by
Sen,149 then why not trade voluntarily as Gibbard suggests?
Why should we apply Sen’s liberal rules to a context in which they
would reduce everyone’s happiness?150 Must liberalism require this type of
“ rule worship,” when no one desires such an outcome? From this
perspective, the conflict between liberalism and the Pareto principle arises
only because Sen extends his liberal principles into circumstances where
they do not properly apply. We can instead adopt a more limited view of
liberalism that would see no harm in the satisfaction of external preferences
if everyone would thereby benefit. This form of liberalism would respect
the weak Pareto principle. For example, D.K. Osborne adopts such a view
of “ the liberal principle” and thus rejects Sen’s liberalism:
The weak Pareto principle operates only in case of unanimity; . . .
in that case the liberal principle is empty. On the other hand the
liberal principle is forceful only in cases of certain kinds of
disagreement; and in those cases the Pareto principle is silent. Thus
when the one is binding the other is either empty or silent. If that is
true they cannot possibly be inconsistent.151
Under a formulation of liberalism that would also respect the strong Pareto
principle, the liberal objection to external preferences would apply only if
someone is harmed by the satisfaction of those preferences.
“ [t]he real issue is . . . whether they will seek such a contract.” Amartya Sen, Foundations of
Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note
22, at 213, 225. We can interpret Barry’s claim, however, to be that liberalism is silent on the
issue of whether people should enter such contracts. If so, then liberalism does not conflict with
the Pareto principle on this issue.
148. Sen, supra note 2, at 235.
149. Sen, supra note 1, at 157.
150. See, e.g., Bernholz, supra note 114, at 100 (“ [N]o one would dream of applying one
decision rule like the rule of liberalism under all circumstances.” ).
151. D.K. Osborne, On Liberalism and the Pareto Principle, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1283, 1286
(1975). Sen responds that Osborne’s claim is “ based on an unadulterated piece of logical error.”
Sen, supra note 2, at 228. Sen explains that his strict preference cycle arises from comparisons
between pairs of alternatives: “ The Pareto principle can operate over one or more pairs (without
conflicting with the liberal principle over those pairs) and the liberal principle can operate over
two or more other pairs (without conflicting with the Pareto principle over those pairs), and these
choices together can be inconsistent.” Id. at 229. Osborne’s claim holds true, however, if we
interpret it as a challenge to the “ liberal principle” that Sen applies to generate the preference
cycle. If we apply a more modest liberal principle that declines to rank pairs when the holder of a
right wants to waive the right (or perhaps reverses the ranking when the holder wants to waive the
right rather than exercise it), then Sen’s response to Osborne fails.
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If L’s decision not to trade disturbs us because it conflicts with Sen’s
utility-based Pareto principle, then our real quarrel is with the content of the
liberal theory used by L, not the Pareto principle. If L confronts the choice
between Sen’s version of liberalism and Sen’s desire-based Pareto
principle, L can reject Sen’s liberalism and instead adopt a less restrictive
form of liberalism that is more sensitive to context and to human happiness.
It does not seem “ deeply illiberal” to refine liberalism along these lines.
Thus, on the issue of whether L and P should choose to trade, there would
be no conflict between liberalism, properly interpreted, and even Sen’s
desire-based Pareto principle. After all, the mere possibility of a plausible
form of liberalism that respects the Pareto principle is sufficient to disprove
Sen’s impossibility claim regarding the Paretian liberal.152
3. Revealed Preference
If, on the other hand, we include political commitments in our notion of
utility, or if we retain a Pareto principle defined in terms of unanimous
preferences that would be revealed by choice, then we have a Pareto
principle that seems more plausible as a universal rule. Once we adopt this
version of the Pareto principle, however, Gibbard’s alienable rights provide
a simple solution to the conflict between even Sen’s demanding version of
liberalism and the Pareto principle. Even if the parties refuse to trade
because they are committed libertarians, their refusal would satisfy the
Pareto principle based on revealed preference.153
152. Sen’s impossibility claim is striking only if his notion of liberalism is uniquely
plausible. See Osborne, supra note 151, at 1285 n.3 (“ [I]f a person is going to insist on claiming
‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,’ he must expect people to examine his concept of
liberalism.” ).
153. Preferences revealed by choice would be what Harsanyi calls “ manifest” preferences.
Supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. If these preferences are not “ true” preferences, then
we have another ambiguity regarding what we mean by the Pareto principle. If we want to uphold
the Pareto principle as applied to “ manifest” preferences, then alienable rights would ensure
compliance with that Pareto principle.
If, however, we choose to uphold the Pareto principle as applied to “ true” preferences, then
alienable rights would not ensure compliance with that Pareto principle, because parties may
choose not to trade even if their “ true” preferences would indicate that they should. This Pareto
principle could in theory justify paternalistic intervention to satisfy the parties’ “ true”
preferences. This intervention could require a trade when one or both parties prefer not to trade, or
it could prohibit a trade when both parties would prefer to trade.
We should not, however, attribute these restrictions on individual choice to the Pareto
principle per se. If we object to these paternalistic restrictions on individual liberty, then we object
to the reliance on “ true” preferences as the morally relevant preferences, not to the Pareto
principle itself. If we instead accept the use of “ true” preferences rather than “ manifest”
preferences, then we would not object to such paternalistic interventions in theory. We would
understand libertarian rights to be qualified by our theory of justified paternalism and therefore
would not consider it an infringement of such rights for the government to implement a Pareto
improvement based on “ true” preferences. This conflict between libertarian rights and the Pareto
principle should disturb us only if we adopt a definition of the Pareto principle inconsistent with
our own beliefs regarding paternalistic interventions.
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In fact, with this version of the Pareto principle, it is not hard to avoid
Sen’s problem, even if libertarian rights are inalienable, as long as we
qualify the assumption of unrestricted domain in the following respect. Sen
notes that as long as “ at least one person respects the rights of others,”
such that this person would always prefer the libertarian outcome “ and
wants that preference to count” in “ deciding what is socially better,” then
libertarian rights will never conflict with the Pareto principle, because the
libertarian’s preference will always prevent an illiberal outcome from being
Pareto superior to the libertarian outcome.154 That is, it only takes one
liberal to veto what would otherwise be a Pareto improvement and thereby
eliminate the potential conflict.155
In fact, we do not even need one person to be consistently liberal. It
would suffice to find one liberal for each decision in which an illiberal
outcome would otherwise be Pareto superior to a liberal outcome. As long
as this one liberal opposes the outcome on liberal grounds, then the illiberal
outcome is not Pareto superior, and the application of the liberal principle
does not conflict with the Pareto principle.
What if the liberal in Sen’s example is neither P nor L, however, but
some third party that we add to the hypothetical? What if this liberal objects
to the alienability of libertarian rights, thus opposes a trade that both P and
L want to make, and thereby prevents application of the Pareto principle to
the transaction? Sen suggests that an “ outsider may try to judge what
should be done and may decide that certain parts of a person’s preferences
should not count in the choice in question,” thereby creating new violations
of the Pareto principle.156 Should we be disturbed by the conflict between
this liberal preference and the Pareto principle, which would favor the
trade?
We should recall that the liberal’s opposition merely implies that the
trade is not required by the Pareto principle. The liberal’s opposition does
not actually prevent the trade unless we assume that our system of
libertarian rights somehow gives this liberal a right to veto the trade. A
libertarian legal system may give the liberal no say in the matter at all and
thus leave it entirely up to P and L whether to trade.
If the only issue is whether we should consider the trade to be a Pareto
improvement in light of the liberal’s opposition, then it is hard to see why
we should exclude the liberal’s political views from consideration. The
liberal’s disapproval of a transaction between P and L may seem
meddlesome under the principle of preference autonomy, but why should
we count P’s and L’s external preferences regarding each other and not
154. Sen, supra note 2, at 236.
155. Kotaro Suzumura, On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims, 45 REV. ECON. STUD.
329, 332 (1978).
156. Sen, supra note 2, at 237.
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count the liberal’s political preference regarding P and L’s trade? If we are
prepared to count P’s and L’s other-regarding preferences, then why not
count the liberal’s as well? Why should we distinguish between these
equally external preferences? If we count all these preferences, then the
trade between P and L is not in fact a Pareto improvement.
Suppose, however, that the liberal does have a right to interfere
because, say, the liberal is a judge with the power to void the contract
between P and L. If the judge prevents this contract, citing liberal
principles, he does not violate a Pareto principle based on revealed
preferences, because his decision itself reveals a preference against the
contract. As Gibbard suggests, however, the judge’s view of liberalism
would not seem very liberal at all.157 This hypothetical takes us back to the
substantive content of the theory that we attribute to the liberal. If the judge
adopts a view of liberal rights like that suggested by Gibbard, then the
judge would not prevent the transaction between P and L. That is, the trade
between P and L would be consistent with an appropriate notion of
liberalism, which would make libertarian rights alienable, so that the parties
could waive their rights if they prefer to do so.
B. The Possibility of a Fair Paretian
We can formulate a response to Kaplow and Shavell’s general claim
about fairness that is similar to our response to Sen’s claim about libertarian
rights. That is, we can object that Kaplow and Shavell have assumed an
unreasonable notion of fairness, much as Sen has assumed an unduly
demanding notion of liberalism. A more plausible fairness theory would
qualify the scope of fairness principles so as not to conflict with the Pareto
principle. In fact, the Pareto principle itself could be part of a complete
theory of fairness. Any plausible fairness theory includes more than one
moral principle, and any such pluralistic theory must specify when some
principles take priority over others. There is nothing in the nature of
fairness theories that prevents them from including the Pareto principle
among their principles and from giving the Pareto principle priority over
others. The incorporation of a fairness principle into a pluralistic moral
theory does not mean that we must apply this principle automatically, in all
cases, as a universal rule that overrides all other principles. Rawls, for

157. Sen agrees with Gibbard on this point, stating, “ I see no reason why rights of this kind
should not in general be taken to be open to contracting and exchange through mutual
agreement.” Sen, supra note 141, at 145-46.

CHANGFINAL.DOC

2000]

NOVEMBER 9, 2000 11/9/00 9:27 PM

A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare

209

example, suggests putting principles in “ serial or lexical order,” so that
some take priority over others.158
We might, for example, conceive of a fairness theory as endowing
individuals with alienable rights that they may invoke to protect their
interests from unfair interference by others. If presented with a situation in
which it would be in their interests to waive this right, however, then they
may do so, as Gibbard would allow individuals to waive libertarian rights.
This alienable right would prevent any conflicts with the Pareto principle,
because the holder of the right would not invoke it if everyone (including
the holder) would prefer that the holder waive the right.
Such a fairness theory would be much less vulnerable to the charge of
“ rule worship” than the crude fairness notions assumed by Kaplow and
Shavell.159 Under this theory, whenever fairness concerns come into play,
these fairness principles serve the interests of the person invoking these
principles. If the charge of unfairness is well-grounded, then the unfair
outcome would be unfair to at least one person. If fairness principles affect
social choices only when an aggrieved individual exists who would prefer
to invoke them, then to take these fairness notions into account would never
amount to “ rule worship.” We would never apply an abstract fairness
principle simply for its own sake, in violation of the Pareto principle,
making everyone in society worse off as a result. Instead, we would employ
the fairness principle only in defense of the interests of some identified
individual.
Kaplow and Shavell claim that such a qualified fairness theory would
not be applying fairness principles on a consistent basis. Thus, they argue
that “ as a matter of logical consistency, if one is to adhere to the Pareto
principle, one cannot give any weight in normative analysis to notions of
fairness.” 160 A more reasonable theory of fairness, however, would reject
the type of mechanical “ consistency” that Kaplow and Shavell require.
Fairness principles, for example, might be principles designed to resolve
disputes only when preferences conflict; these principles would not be
relevant when preferences are unanimous. It should seem natural to restrict
the domain of fairness principles in this way: If there is unanimous
agreement that one state of affairs is better than another, then there would
be no issue for fairness principles to resolve.
These fairness principles would be principles of social justice, designed
to evaluate when it is legitimate to sacrifice the interests of some in order to
satisfy the preferences of others. Rawls, for example, describes “ the role of
158. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 42; see, e.g., id. at 302-03 (giving liberty priority over his
second principle of justice and giving his principles of justice priority over efficiency and
welfare).
159. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 72-73.
160. Id. at 72.
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the principles of justice” as defining “ the appropriate distribution of the
benefits and burdens of social cooperation” in the face of “ a conflict of
interests” over this distribution.161 These principles of distributive justice
are necessary to rank two alternatives when neither alternative Paretodominates the other. We do not need these principles, however, in order to
rank two alternatives when one Pareto-dominates the other. In the case of a
Pareto improvement, there is no conflict of interest to resolve.
To take a more concrete example, consider the liberal consequentialism
described in Part I. To avoid a conflict with the Pareto principle, we would
need to qualify that consequentialism much as we qualified Sen’s liberalism
to avoid a conflict with the Pareto principle. We would have to count
external preferences when we rank a Pareto superior outcome over a Pareto
inferior outcome, but we might exclude external preferences when we
choose between two alternatives that cannot be ranked using the Pareto
principle. That is, as Thomas Scanlon urges,
[W]hen we set out to compare . . . conflicting interests with the aim
of supporting a moral judgment as to which should be allowed to
prevail, what we do is not compare how strongly the people in
question feel about these interests . . . but rather inquire into the
reasons for which these benefits are considered desirable.” 162
Kaplow and Shavell claim that it would be “ odd” to adopt different
principles for normative analysis depending on whether one of the
alternatives under consideration Pareto-dominates the other, because
“ trivial changes in facts would alter the entire basis for assessing legal
policies.” 163 They illustrate this point using a hypothetical in which
everyone is better off under regime Y than in regime Z, but person i is better
off by only one penny. Consider regime X, which is exactly like regime Y
except for its effect on person i, who is worse off under regime X than
under regime Z by one penny. Why should a fairness principle come into
play in comparing X and Z, but not in comparing Y and Z, just because one
person is better off under Y than under X by pennies?
The answer is that these two choices are fundamentally different. There
is a critical qualitative difference between these choices, even if they seem
similar in terms of quantitative welfare effects. There is a risk that choosing
X over Z is unfair to person i, who may suffer a loss (albeit a small loss) in
order to satisfy the external preferences of someone else. There is no such
risk in choosing Y over Z, because even person i benefits from that

161. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 4.
162. T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 660 (1975) (emphasis added).
163. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 72 n.20.
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reform.164 Thus, Y is unambiguously better than Z, but X is not, even if X
and Y differ from one another by only two pennies.165
To reject a Pareto superior outcome like Y for a Pareto inferior outcome
like Z because we disapprove of the preferences that make Y the Pareto
superior outcome would fail to show liberal respect for the principle of
preference autonomy. We would be telling individuals that they should not
seek to satisfy their preferences, even if no one objects, because we do not
respect their preferences. This intrusion into individuals’ intrapersonal
comparison of values would seem inconsistent with liberal principles. Thus,
it should seem especially appropriate for a liberal consequentialist to
respect the Pareto principle in ranking outcomes.
When comparing outcomes like X and Z, which do not Pareto-dominate
one another, matters are quite different. To reject an outcome that makes
some worse off compared to the alternative does not violate the principle of
preference autonomy. As Scanlon explains:
The reasons . . . for excluding “ moral” and “ antisocial”
preferences from the determination of individual utility functions
are not strictly inconsistent with this principle, because they do not
assert that the fulfillment of these preferences is not good for the
individuals in question. All that is asserted is that these preferences
“ have no claim on us” —that is, on society—for their fulfillment.
Denying that they have such a claim need not involve “ telling
people what is good for them” —it represents a moral judgment, not
a judgment of value that is in conflict with theirs.166
The exclusion of external preferences is then entirely appropriate when
we compare outcomes that the Pareto principle cannot rank, because then
we are asking some individuals to make sacrifices to satisfy the preferences
of others. In this context, interpersonal comparisons of welfare are
necessary. We must ask what preferences give rise to a moral claim, which
others are obliged to satisfy, and “ differences between preferences . . . are
of great relevance when these preferences are taken as the basis for moral
claims.” 167
164. Fried states this point “ in Kantian terms” ; that is, to permit a Pareto improvement
“ means we are not trading off one person’s welfare for another’s,” and thus “ we are not using
one person for another’s ends.” Fried, supra note 69, at 24. Where “ one person is left worse off,”
however, “ for a Kantian the problem of whether one person’s rights are unfairly compromised for
the good of others is raised.” Id. at 25.
165. It is not unusual that the outcome of our normative analysis might turn on two pennies.
It would also be true under utilitarianism, for example, that we might rank alternatives differently
in marginal cases if we change one alternative by mere pennies.
166. Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17, 28 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds.,
1991).
167. Scanlon, supra note 162, at 659.
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In the case of a Pareto improvement, on the other hand, no one requires
anyone else to make a sacrifice. Thus, no interpersonal comparisons are
necessary, and no one needs to assert a moral claim over anyone else. It is
noteworthy that when Dworkin explains why a utilitarian should exclude
external preferences, he suggests that a utilitarianism that counted such
preferences would fail to provide “ a justification compatible with the right
of those it disadvantages to be treated as equals” if they “ will suffer . . .
from the fact that others think them less worthy of respect and concern.” 168
Similarly, when Harsanyi justifies the exclusion of antisocial preferences,
he explains that such preferences would not justify “ hurting a third
person.” 169 The justifications for excluding external preferences, therefore,
address the usual case in which satisfying an external preference harms
someone else. The underlying reasons for the exclusion of external
preferences do not apply in the unusual case in which satisfying these
preferences meets with unanimous approval and thus produces a Pareto
improvement.170 This distinction is consistent with Mill’s liberal principle
that “ the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.” 171 Thus, a reasonable fairness theory, especially a liberal theory,
might concede that a Pareto improvement is always a desirable choice,
regardless of the nature of the preferences that make the choice a Pareto
improvement, but simultaneously maintain that when we make some worse
off to satisfy the preferences of others, it must be for a legitimate reason. A
liberal theory of fairness might elaborate on what constitutes a legitimate
reason by excluding the satisfaction of external preferences from this set of
reasons.
A critic of fairness might try to resurrect the conflict between fairness
and the Pareto principle as Sen resurrects the conflict between liberalism
and the Pareto principle. That is, the critic might suppose that one party is
considering a transaction that would violate a fairness principle yet make
everyone better off. There is no issue of preference autonomy, because the
individual is contemplating imposing fairness principles upon herself, not
upon any other person. Our first response might be to assert that the correct
fairness theory would not stand in the way of such a transaction. If this
party persists in the belief that the transaction is unfair, however, and
168. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 235.
169. Harsanyi, supra note 63, at 56.
170. In a similar vein, Posner criticizes utilitarians for ascribing value to “ envy and cruelty”
but defends a “ well-regulated market economy” in which an individual cannot “ promote his selfinterest without benefiting others as well as himself.” POSNER, supra note 70, at 83 (noting that
“ lawfully obtained wealth is created by doing things for other people—offering them
advantageous trades” ). Posner endorses a “ rights system” that would require a sadist to buy his
victims’ consent and thus “ to pay them whatever compensation they demand.” Id. at 82.
171. MILL, supra note 82, at 6.
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refuses to transact, then the principle of preference autonomy requires us to
respect the preference revealed by that choice, which implies that the
transaction is not (all things considered) a Pareto improvement.
Following Sen, the critic of fairness might insist that the transaction
remains a Pareto improvement if we define preference in terms of desire
rather than choice and thereby exclude political commitments from our
definition of utility. Our response would be twofold: First, the conflict
identified would be between the Pareto principle and a false theory of
fairness, not a correct theory of fairness. Second, in any event, a Pareto
principle defined in terms of desire rather than choice would not be a
principle that we would be inclined to apply as a universal rule.
In any event, Kaplow and Shavell do not exclude political preferences
from their definition of utility. Unlike Sen, they include moral and political
preferences (such as “ tastes for fairness” ) in their definition of individual
utility.172 Therefore, the conflict that they describe is even easier to avoid
than Sen’s in the following sense: As long as one individual is “ fair,” such
that this individual always prefers the outcome dictated by the fairness
theory in question, then this fairness theory never conflicts with the Pareto
principle, because this preference for fairness always prevents an unfair
outcome from being Pareto superior to a fair outcome. It is also sufficient
if, for each decision between an unfair outcome and a fair outcome that
would otherwise be Pareto inferior to the unfair outcome, there exists at
least one person who prefers the fair outcome on fairness grounds. Kaplow
and Shavell’s claim of conflict with the Pareto principle assumes an
unrestricted domain of possible individual preferences and thus requires
that neither of these plausible conditions hold for the fairness theory in
question.
IV. FAIR SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS
One feature of utilitarianism that its proponents find appealing is its
ability to provide a “ complete” ranking of alternatives.173 That is,
utilitarianism assigns each alternative a rank such that in any given pair of
alternatives, either one alternative ranks higher than the other or the two
alternatives are of equal rank.174 Can a fairness theory generate a complete
172. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 75.
173. Sen & Williams, supra note 91, at 17 (noting that “ completeness is often seen as a
merit” and that with full interpersonal comparison of cardinal utility, “ utilitarianism yields a
complete ordering” ).
174. See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 34 (1984) (defining a
“ complete” ordering); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 26 (3d ed. 1953) (same). The Pareto principle by itself, on the other hand,
does not provide a complete ranking of alternatives. The Pareto principle can rank alternatives
only if one alternative is Pareto superior to the other. If neither alternative in a pair Pareto-
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ranking of feasible alternatives without conflicting with the Pareto
principle? That is, can a fair theory of social welfare remain faithful to the
Pareto principle over an unrestricted domain of possible individual
preferences without generating cycles of preference like those encountered
by Sen? If so, what would such a social welfare function look like?
To illustrate the features of such a social welfare function, consider
some “ crude” fairness criterion that generates a complete ranking of these
states of the world, but disregards the Pareto principle and therefore
sometimes violates that principle. This fairness criterion might be, for
example, the liberal consequentialism outlined in Part I, or it may be a more
complex theory of fairness. The precise content of this fairness theory does
not matter for our purposes here, as long as it provides a complete ranking
and sometimes violates the Pareto principle. Let F denote this fairness
criterion, and let S denote the set of feasible alternatives.175 That is, S is the
set of alternatives actually available to us as possible social choices in the
real world.176
Suppose we reject F as a universal rule because we believe in the
Pareto principle and seek a more refined fairness theory that respects the
Pareto principle. Suppose we adopt the principle that we should rank states

dominates the other, then the Pareto principle does not tell us whether one alternative should get a
higher rank or whether the two alternatives are of equal rank.
175. I assume that the purpose of our social welfare function is to guide social choices,
and we can make such choices only among feasible alternatives. See Kevin W.S. Roberts,
Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory, 47 REV. ECON. STUD. 421, 422 (1980)
(“ We are interested in obtaining a social ordering . . . defined over the set of feasible social states
X.” ) (emphasis omitted). The “ unrestricted domain” condition then requires that our social choice
function generate a ranking of those feasible alternatives for any possible set of individual
preferences. Id.
176. A social choice can have implications for the feasibility of alternatives in the future. To
analyze a sequence of social choices over time, it is useful to conceive of alternatives as a game
theorist conceives of strategies chosen by a player in a game. Game theorists define a “ strategy”
as “ a complete plan of action,” which “ specifies a feasible action for the player in every
contingency in which the player might be called on to act.” ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY
FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 117 (1992) (emphasis omitted); see also ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES
AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 24 (1989) (defining a strategy for any
player as “ a rule that tells him which action to choose at each instant of the game, given his
information set” ); VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 174, at 79 (defining a strategy
as “ a plan which specifies what choices [a player] will make in every possible situation, for every
possible actual information which he may possess at that moment” ). We can similarly define an
alternative as “ a complete contingent plan in advance.” D REW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE,
GAME THEORY 85 (1991).
At any given decision node, we may also be uncertain regarding whether a specific result is
feasible. We can analyze the social choice at that node by considering the attempt to achieve that
result as a feasible action with uncertain consequences. We can evaluate actions with uncertain
consequences according to the expected values for utility and for fairness, taking the average
value over the possible results, with each result given weight in proportion to the probability of
that particular outcome. See KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 53
(1971) (“ One action will be preferred to another if and only if the expected value of the utility of
its consequences is greater.” ). See generally LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
STATISTICS 263 (1954) (defining “ expected value” ).
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according to criterion F unless to do so would violate the weak Pareto
principle. Criterion F could violate the weak Pareto principle either directly
or indirectly (by generating a preference cycle). Thus, we give the weak
Pareto principle lexical priority over criterion F. We could also use the
strong Pareto principle if we wanted our social welfare function to uphold
not only the weak principle but also the strong principle, but the weak
Pareto principle is sufficient to illustrate the relevant issues.
We can ensure compliance with the Pareto principle if we allow
individuals to alienate the right to fairness. In particular, suppose that each
individual enjoys an alienable right to an alternative that is optimal
according to criterion F. This optimum determines a baseline entitlement
for each individual, who can exercise an option to waive the right to this
“ fair” outcome in exchange for another alternative that the individual
prefers over this “ fair” benchmark. If the preference for this alternative
over the “ fair” benchmark is unanimous, then this alternative is Pareto
superior to the “ fair” outcome, and we must deem social welfare to be
higher under the Pareto superior alternative. In effect, if and only if there is
unanimous agreement, then we allow parties to trade their rights to the
fairness optimum in exchange for an alternative that all prefer, and we
require our social welfare function to respect this unanimous preference in
ranking these alternatives.177
To guard against preference cycles, suppose we also impose the
condition of “ transitivity” on our social welfare function. “ Transitivity”
means that if x is at least as good as y, and y is at least as good as z, then x is
at least as good as z.178 Transitivity also implies that if x is socially
preferable to y, and y is socially preferable to z, then x is socially preferable
to z, which in turn ensures that there are no cycles of strict preference.179
Suppose we search through the rankings under F for conflicts with the
Pareto principle, then revise these rankings to eliminate these conflicts.
Given any finite set S of alternatives, we can apply the following
refinement procedure to implement this revision:
(1) Identify those alternatives in set S that rank highest according to
criterion F. For example, if criterion F is the liberal consequentialism
outlined in Part I, then these alternatives are those that appear optimal from
the perspective of the satisfaction of personal preferences. Each individual
177. Each individual enjoys the same alienable right to the fair outcome and can waive this
right only with the consent of all other individuals. Because this alienable right is enjoyed by all
on an equal basis, it differs from the alienable right proposed by Gibbard, which “ gives a person a
special voice on an issue . . . [and thus] cannot be accorded indiscriminately.” Gibbard, supra
note 120, at 404. A right to fairness that requires unanimous consent for waiver is sufficiently
alienable to ensure compliance with the Pareto principle. We can relax this unanimity requirement
to allow more frequent waivers of the right to the fair outcome. Infra Section IV.C.
178. Sen, supra note 9, at 1079.
179. Id.
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is entitled to have society choose one of these “ fair” alternatives.
Ultimately, however, we can consider these alternatives to be socially
optimal only if the Pareto principle does not require otherwise.
(2) Within this “ fair” subset of S, eliminate those alternatives that are
Pareto inferior to any alternative in set S. Any alternatives remaining are
Pareto optimal. We can assign these alternatives the highest levels of social
welfare, pursuant to criterion F, because the Pareto principle does not
require otherwise. Denote this Pareto optimal set A and assign these
alternatives the highest rank. We deem these alternatives to be socially
optimal.
(3) Consider the alternatives within the “ fair” subset of S that are not
Pareto optimal. Within this new subset of “ fair” alternatives, eliminate
those alternatives that are Pareto-dominated by other alternatives in the
same subset. All individuals would prefer to waive their rights to these
Pareto inferior alternatives in exchange for the Pareto superior alternatives.
We must assign these Pareto inferior alternatives a lower level of welfare
than the Pareto superior alternatives, pursuant to the Pareto principle.
(4) Let C denote the remaining subset of “ fair” alternatives, and assign
these alternatives equal levels of social welfare. The Pareto principle does
not require different rankings for these alternatives, and we are indifferent
among these alternatives according to criterion F. Among the alternatives
falling outside set A, these alternatives are optimal only provisionally,
subject to further application of the Pareto principle, because other
alternatives that appear inferior according to our fairness criterion F may
Pareto-dominate some of the alternatives in set C.
(5) Identify those alternatives in set S that Pareto-dominate at least one
alternative in set C, and let B denote this new subset of S. For example, if
criterion F is the liberal consequentialism we applied to Sen’s example,
then alternative l (in which L reads the book) may fall in set C but is
nevertheless Pareto inferior to alternative p (in which P reads the book). If l
falls in set C, then we must place p in set B. All individuals would prefer to
waive their rights to the Pareto inferior alternatives in set C in exchange for
the corresponding Pareto superior alternatives in set B. We assign all
alternatives in set B higher levels of social welfare than assigned
alternatives in set C, pursuant to the Pareto principle.
(6) Let D denote the set of all alternatives in set S that fall outside sets
A, B, and C. All alternatives in set D either are Pareto-dominated by at least
one alternative in set C or receive lower rankings than alternatives in set C
according to criterion F. Either the Pareto principle or criterion F requires
us to deem social welfare to be lower in alternatives in set D than in
alternatives in set C. Therefore, we assign all alternatives in set D lower
levels of social welfare than assigned alternatives in set C. For example,
suppose criterion F is the liberal consequentialism we applied to Sen’s
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example. The Pareto principle cannot rank alternative o (in which neither P
nor L read the book) and alternative l (in which L reads the book), but
criterion F would rank l over o based on the satisfaction of L’s personal
preferences. If alternative l falls in set C, then we place o in set D and
assign it a lower level of social welfare than that attributed to l.
(7) To rank alternatives within set B or set D, repeat steps (1) through
(6) for each set. That is, apply the same steps to each set that we applied to
set S. For example, use steps (1) through (6) to partition set B into subsets
BA, BB, BC, and BD. In deciding which alternatives within set B are
socially optimal, we continue to use both the fairness criterion F and the
Pareto principle in ranking the alternatives in set B. Criterion F determines
the baseline entitlements (subset BC) in set B that individuals are allowed to
trade for Pareto superior alternatives (in subset BB). Continue to partition
into smaller subsets until all alternatives in set S have been ranked. Because
each partition complies with the Pareto principle, the ranking that results
from this series of partitions will also comply with the Pareto principle.
Let F* denote this procedure and the refined fairness theory that it
embodies. This F* is a social welfare function, which takes information
about alternatives in set S as inputs and generates a ranking of these
alternatives as its output. Because we construct the rankings under F*
through a series of partitions, these rankings cannot feature any preference
cycles. The function F* requires fairness information to determine the
location of these partitions, which are based on the identification of fairness
optima, and cannot generate its rankings using utility information alone.
Therefore, F* embodies a fairness theory and is not a welfarist social
welfare function.180
Thus, the social welfare function F* incorporates fairness principles
and satisfies the Pareto principle without generating preference cycles.181 In
180. The rankings under F* depend on fairness considerations. One can of course contrive
special examples in which the rankings under F* will not depend on fairness information. For
example, consider a set S containing only two alternatives, one Pareto superior to the other. Any
Paretian theory, including not only welfarism but also F*, will rank the Pareto superior alternative
higher than the Pareto inferior alternative, regardless of fairness considerations. Such examples do
not show that F* is welfarist, however, because F* would be welfarist only if its rankings were
independent of fairness information for any set S. As long as F* incorporates fairness
considerations anywhere, under any circumstances, it is a fairness theory and not a welfarist
theory. Kaplow and Shavell define “ conceptions of fairness” to be principles based “ at least in
part” on factors unrelated to individual utility, Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 65, so that
“ fairness” theories include “ mixed views,” which give weight not only to notions of fairness but
also to individual utility, id. at 67.
181. The F* described above is only one example of a fair Paretian social welfare function.
We can describe other fair ranking procedures that we can apply to finite sets of alternatives while
complying with the Pareto principle. Consider, for example, the following procedure for ranking
alternatives in set S. Rank all Pareto optimal alternatives according to our fairness criterion F.
Give the highest rank to those Pareto optimal alternatives that rank highest according to this
fairness criterion and declare them to be socially optimal. To rank the remaining alternatives,
delete these socially optimal alternatives from set S, and repeat the procedure. That is, apply the
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fact, it also satisfies the requirement of transitivity. Our compliance with
the Pareto principle ensures that the alternatives that rank highest under this
definition of social welfare are also Pareto optimal, but F* also allows
fairness principles to set baseline entitlements and thus to determine which
Pareto optimum we will consider socially optimal. Thus, fairness principles
and the rights they confer upon individuals play an important role in
determining the optimal distribution of benefits and burdens in society.
As long as set S remains finite, we can apply the function F* to an
arbitrarily large number of alternatives.182 We cannot, however, apply F* to
all infinite sets of alternatives.183 If we want a social welfare function that
we can apply to any infinite set S, then we can consider the following
procedure, which is analogous to F*:
(1) Rank all alternatives according to criterion F. To eliminate the
possibility that a Pareto inferior alternative and a Pareto superior alternative
have the same rank, apply a welfarist principle to break ties in fairness
rankings.184 The use of a welfarist tiebreaker creates a finer set of rankings
within each fairness rank, much as F* identifies set C as a subset of
alternatives within a fairness rank.
(2) If any of these ranks within a fairness rank includes Pareto optimal
alternatives, then use Pareto optimality as a further tiebreaker. That is, give
these Pareto optima a separate higher rank, much as F* separates set A from
set C. If the highest rank includes such Pareto optima, then these optima are
also social optima.
(3) Within each fairness rank, finer rankings based on welfarist
principles ensure consistency with the Pareto principle. These rankings,
however, may still conflict with the Pareto principle across different
fairness ranks. To eliminate the possibility that a Pareto superior alternative
has a lower rank than a Pareto inferior alternative in some other fairness
rank, give each such Pareto superior alternative a new rank. In particular,
procedure to the remaining alternatives, assuming that the higher ranking alternatives are
unavailable. Give the next highest rank to the socially optimal alternatives for the remaining set.
Continue until we have ranked all alternatives in set S.
182. Finite sets of alternatives have been the traditional focus of social choice theorists.
Graciela Chichilnisky, Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity, 97 Q.J. ECON. 337, 337 (1982)
(noting that in the “ vast literature” on social choice, “ most existing work has focused on
problems where the individuals face a finite number of choices” ).
183. For example, a technical problem arises if set D does not contain its own boundary, such
that we cannot identify an optimal alternative within that set. Savage describes this problem:
“ Suppose, for example, that you were free to choose any income, provided it be definitely less
than $100,000 per year. Precisely which income would you choose, abstracting from the
indivisibility of pennies?” SAVAGE, supra note 176, at 18; see also id. (“ If infinite sets of
available acts are set up and interpreted without some mathematical tact, unrealistic conclusions
are likely to follow.” ).
184. The welfarist principle does not have to be utilitarian. For example, it can be the
“ leximin” rule. Infra note 198. Allowing a welfarist principle to play some limited role in
determining rankings does not render this procedure a welfarist social welfare function. Supra
note 180.
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for each alternative, consider the set of all Pareto inferior alternatives. If
any Pareto inferior alternative has a higher rank than the alternative in
question, then give that alternative a new rank that is higher than the highest
ranking Pareto inferior alternative but no higher. Thus, for each rank, create
a set of alternatives that ranks higher than the rank in question but lower
than any higher rank. This set collects all alternatives that are Pareto
superior to any alternative in the rank in question but not to any higher
ranking alternative, much as set B in F* collects alternatives that are Pareto
superior to at least one alternative in set C.185
(4) To rank alternatives within these newly created sets in a manner
consistent with the Pareto principle, repeat steps (1) through (3) for each
set. Continue to partition into smaller subsets until all alternatives of
interest have been ranked.186
Let F** denote this procedure and the fairness theory that it embodies.
The F** procedure is a social welfare function with features similar to
those of F*.187 Like the F* procedure, the F** procedure makes its rankings
a function of fairness information but nevertheless complies with the Pareto
principle. Thus, F** is a second example of a fair Paretian social welfare
function.
How do our new rankings under F* and F** compare with our original
rankings under F? The difference between the rankings under either F* or
F** and the rankings under F will depend on how frequently criterion F
actually violates the Pareto principle in set S. For example, suppose that
185. These new rankings will not rank any Pareto superior alternative below a Pareto inferior
alternative, because Pareto superiority is transitive. Thus, when we move an alternative up the
rankings to outrank all Pareto inferior alternatives, the alternative in question will not outrank any
Pareto superior alternative, because any Pareto superior alternative would have to move at least as
high in the rankings. Any Pareto superior alternative would be Pareto superior to any alternative
that is Pareto inferior to the alternative in question. Similarly, any Pareto inferior alternative
would receive a rank no higher than the alternative in question, even if the Pareto inferior
alternative moves up the ranks, because the alternative in question would have to move at least as
high in the rankings. The alternative in question would be Pareto superior to any alternative that is
Pareto inferior to the Pareto inferior alternative.
186. Ranking an infinite number of alternatives under this procedure could require an infinite
number of steps. This feature, however, does not distinguish this procedure from welfarist ranking
procedures. A utilitarian, for example, would have to calculate average or total utility for an
infinite number of alternatives in order to rank them. Thus, the proposed procedure can provide a
complete ranking of an infinite number of alternatives in the same sense that a utilitarian theory
can. Using the proposed procedure to rank a finite number of alternatives within set S, however,
could also require an infinite number of steps if set S contains an infinite number of alternatives.
This feature distinguishes this procedure from welfarist ranking procedures and raises practical
problems in actually implementing the procedure. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the
implications of this analysis for making social choices in practice).
187. The F** procedure gives welfarism a somewhat larger role than the F* procedure does,
insofar as F** uses a welfarist principle to break ties under criterion F. Nevertheless, F** never
ranks a less fair alternative above a more fair alternative unless the Pareto principle requires this
ranking. In this sense, F** respects each individual’s alienable right to a fair alternative, because
when there are multiple fairness optima, no one enjoys an entitlement to any particular optimum
on fairness grounds.
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among all feasible alternatives, we find exactly one conflict between the
rankings produced by criterion F and the Pareto principle. That is, criterion
F ranks only one alternative below a Pareto inferior alternative, contrary to
the Pareto principle. The only effect of the F* procedure would be to move
that one alternative up the rankings just far enough to outrank the Pareto
inferior alternative. In that case, the refined ranking under F* would differ
from the ranking under criterion F with respect only to this one alternative.
If conflicts between criterion F and the Pareto principle are rare, then the
social welfare function F* will resemble fairness criterion F. If these
conflicts are common, however, then the differences between F* and F will
multiply. Therefore, we cannot describe the rankings under F* without
knowing not only criterion F but also how often this criterion violates the
Pareto principle in set S. Similarly, for any given F, the change in the
rankings produced by the F** procedure would be sensitive to the
assumptions we make regarding set S.
A simple example, however, illustrates how we would expect both F*
and F** to preserve an important role for fairness even in the presence of a
conflict between criterion F and the Pareto principle. Suppose criterion F is
the liberal consequentialism outlined in Part I. In particular, suppose F calls
for the maximization of total satisfaction of personal preferences. Suppose
also that P and L are the only two individuals in our society and that we
must make exactly two social choices. First, we must choose between
alternative p and alternative l in Sen’s example, where both P and L favor p
over l based on their external preferences.188 Second, we must distribute
wealth to P and L subject to the constraint that we cannot distribute more
than the total amount of wealth in the economy, which we take to be a fixed
amount. Thus, each alternative in set S specifies not only a choice between
p and l but also the distribution of wealth.
Suppose that P would derive the same satisfaction from consuming any
given amount of wealth that L would and that each individual would derive
diminishing marginal utility from consuming this wealth. Then our fairness
criterion F would not only favor l over p but also call for an equal division
of all wealth between P and L, which would maximize the satisfaction of
personal preferences. Suppose, however, that L also harbors malice toward
P, such that it satisfies L’s malicious preference to reduce P’s utility. The
criterion of utility maximization would take such external preferences into
account and thus not only favor p over l but also call for a division of
wealth biased in favor of L and against P, which would cater to L’s
malicious preference.

188. For simplicity of exposition, assume that alternative o is not a feasible social choice.
Adding a third alternative like o would make the example more complicated without affecting any
important results.
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What alternative would we choose under F* (assuming a finite set of
alternatives) or under F** (allowing for an infinite set of alternatives) in
this example? Our fairness criterion F favors outcome l combined with an
equal division of all wealth. This unique fairness optimum would not be
Pareto optimal, however, and would fall into set C in the F* procedure,
leaving set A empty. Set B would be a set of Pareto superior alternatives
featuring outcome p rather than outcome l and would rank higher than set
C. The social optimum within this set B would be outcome p combined with
an equal division of all wealth, which would be Pareto optimal and
therefore fall in set BA.189 Similarly, F** would select the same alternative
as the social optimum. Thus, both F* and F** would favor p over l, like
any Paretian theory would, but they would also protect P from any
disadvantage based on L’s malice. That is, both F* and F** would ensure
that both P and L enjoy at least the utility that they would enjoy under the
fairness optimum under criterion F. Welfarist theories cannot guarantee this
baseline entitlement, because they must ignore all fairness concerns and
thus take all of L’s external preferences to be morally relevant.
That is, any given welfarist theory could make an individual worse off
than he would be under the fairness optimum under criterion F.190 For
example, as long as L’s malice is sufficiently intense and P’s gain in
moving from l to p is sufficiently small, utility maximization would call for
a distribution of wealth so biased against P that P would prefer the fairness
optimum, despite its choice of outcome l rather than p, because it would
also provide P with an equal share of wealth. Under either F* or F**,
fairness entitlements protect P from such a biased outcome, even if that
outcome is optimal from a welfarist perspective, because that outcome
would not be a Pareto improvement over the fairness optimum. In this
sense, fairness concerns under F* or F** still trump welfarist
considerations even if our fairness criterion F yields in the face of a Pareto
improvement.191 Although the right to fairness is alienable under F* or F**,
an individual like P can still invoke this right to veto the social choice
favored by a welfarist. Similarly, this right to fairness, for example, would
189. There would be no conflict between criterion F and the Pareto principle within this set
B, because all alternatives within this set would feature outcome p. Thus, we would rank
alternatives within set B simply according to our fairness criterion F, which would favor an equal
division of wealth.
190. This feature is inherent in welfarism, because any welfarist theory must ignore all
fairness considerations and select a social optimum based only on utility information. Given this
constraint, no welfarist theory can ensure that the optimum it selects will have any particular
relationship with the fairness optimum. Given utility information, the welfarist is committed to the
same social choice, regardless of fairness information. Thus, the welfarist cannot adjust this social
choice in light of new information regarding the fairness optimum. Only a fairness theory can
make its social choice a function of such information.
191. I have described F* and F** as giving the Pareto principle priority over fairness
principles, but we can also describe F* or F** as giving alienable rights to fairness priority over
welfarist considerations. Both characterizations describe the same theory.
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protect the Jew from the Nazi’s external preference in Hare’s hypothetical,
whereas welfarism cannot offer the same guarantee. Thus, the right to
invoke fairness concerns under F* or F** ensures that individuals enjoy at
least the level of utility to which they would be entitled under F, and in this
sense protects individual interests to the same degree that F would.192
A. Continuity
These examples are sufficient to disprove Kaplow and Shavell’s claim
that any social welfare function that incorporates fairness concerns
must violate the Pareto principle. Neither F* nor F** is “ individualistic”
as Kaplow and Shavell use this term.193 That is, it is possible for two
192. Ranking alternatives in set D under F* in our example requires us to move all
alternatives featuring outcome p up the rankings so that they outrank any Pareto inferior
alternatives featuring outcome l. The alternatives featuring outcome l would not change rankings
with respect to one another, but all alternatives featuring outcome p would move up the rankings
with respect to at least some alternatives featuring outcome l. With each iteration of our
refinement procedure, set C for the current iteration moves further down the rankings under
criterion F, further away from the fairness optimum for set S as a whole. As we move away from
the fairness optimum for set S, each iteration allows a greater range of possible levels of utility for
each individual in set C. This greater range implies that criterion F in this example will provide a
lower constraint on the utility to which each individual is entitled as we move away from the
fairness optimum for set S. The rankings under F** for the alternatives in set D are similar but
complicated further by the use of a welfarist principle as a tiebreaker.
The rankings within set D, however, would become relevant for the social choices we
actually make only if the alternatives in higher ranking sets are not available. If those alternatives
are not available, however, then set S is not as we have assumed, and we would have to apply our
refinement procedure to a different set S. A different set S, however, would generally imply
different rankings for alternatives within set D. See infra Section IV.B (discussing how the
rankings under F* are generally a function of the entire feasible set S). Our rankings within our
original set D would become relevant only in the very special case that the actual set S coincides
exactly with this set D. In general, however, we would expect criterion F and the constraints on
set S to produce a unique fairness optimum such that fairness principles would give each
individual a substantial entitlement. Thus, under F* or F**, fairness considerations generally exert
the most force precisely where it counts the most as a practical matter: in actually making a social
choice from any given set S.
193. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 2. There is some ambiguity regarding what
Kaplow and Shavell mean by “ individualistic.” In general, they appear to use the term to refer to
welfarist social welfare functions. They also use the term, however, to refer to all social welfare
functions that comply with the Pareto indifference rule, which holds that if every individual is
indifferent between two alternatives, then we should be socially indifferent between those two
alternatives. See Sen, supra note 9, at 1075. Kaplow and Shavell assume that compliance with the
Pareto indifference rule is equivalent to welfarism, which requires “ strong neutrality,” such that
“ the utility information regarding any two social states is all that is needed for ranking that pair.”
Id. at 1121. These two concepts, however, are in general not equivalent. Id. at 1154-55. Strong
neutrality implies the Pareto indifference rule, but the converse implication does not hold unless
we make “ quite demanding” assumptions. Id. at 1155. That is, social welfare functions may
comply with the Pareto indifference rule without being welfarist.
For example, we could have qualified our fairness principle F further, so as to comply with
not only the weak Pareto principle but also the Pareto indifference rule. To implement this
additional qualification, we could modify steps (2) and (4) in the F* procedure to expand sets A
and C accordingly. For example, if each individual is indifferent between a “ fair” alternative in
set C and another alternative, then we would include both alternatives in set C. The rationale
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alternatives, y and z, to yield the same levels of utility for each individual in
society yet receive different rankings in terms of social welfare. Suppose,
for example, that y fares better than z according to criterion F, such that
when we apply the F* procedure, y falls in set C, but z falls in the lower
ranked set D. Similarly, it is possible for F** to rank y above z. Kaplow and
Shavell offer a formal proof to support their claim that any such social
welfare function violates the Pareto principle.194
How then do F* and F** incorporate fairness concerns without
violating the Pareto principle? Our functions F* and F** do not come under
Kaplow and Shavell’s formal proof because both functions violate an
assumption of continuity that Kaplow and Shavell use to prove their
claim.195 That is, Kaplow and Shavell assume that we can achieve an
arbitrarily small change in the ranking of any given alternative by making a
sufficiently small change in that alternative in the appropriate respect.
Consider, for example, states y (in set C) and z (in set D) as described
above. Suppose that an arbitrarily small increase in some good for all
individuals in state z yields a third state x in which each individual enjoys
only a slightly higher level of utility in x than in z. Kaplow and Shavell
assume that the social welfare function must increase continuously such
that a sufficiently small increase in some good for all individuals in state z
would still yield a lower level of social welfare in the new state x than in the
“ fair” state y. This ranking would violate the Pareto principle, which would
instead rank the Pareto superior state x above the Pareto inferior “ fair” state
y. The F* procedure, however, would place any such Pareto superior state x
in set B, giving x a higher ranking than both state y (in set C) and state z (in
set D), consistent with the Pareto principle. Similarly, the F** procedure
would place state x above not only state z but also state y in the rankings.
That is, any change in state z that creates a Pareto improvement over state z,
no matter how small in quantitative terms, would yield a discontinuity, as
the new state x would jump past state y in the rankings.
Kaplow and Shavell do not explain, however, why we should require a
social welfare function to feature their particular continuity property. It is
certainly a stronger requirement than the weak Pareto principle. Although a
would be that if all are willing to exchange the “ fair” alternative (to which they are entitled) for
another alternative, but no one would strictly prefer to make this trade, then we should assign the
same level of social welfare to these two alternatives. Similarly, we could modify F** to use the
Pareto indifference rule to move alternatives up the rankings. I have, however, designed both F*
and F** to be “ non-individualistic” in both senses used by Kaplow and Shavell, so that they
respond specifically to their formal claim without any ambiguity.
194. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 3. Kaplow and Shavell interpret their proof as if
it applied to any social welfare function that incorporates notions of fairness. This proof, however,
assumes that all such functions violate the Pareto indifference rule, whereas only a subset of all
social welfare functions incorporating notions of fairness violate the Pareto indifference rule.
Supra note 193. Thus, Kaplow and Shavell’s formal proof is not as general as they seem to claim.
195. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 3.
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utilitarian social welfare function would be continuous in this sense, other
social welfare functions need not exhibit this specific feature. There is no
apparent reason why a slight increase in consumption of some good might
not have a discontinuous impact on social welfare, especially if it is so
widespread as to be shared by all individuals in society. Indeed, if we
accept both the Pareto principle and fairness principles, then we might most
reasonably view Kaplow and Shavell’s proof as a decisive reason to reject
such a continuity requirement as unacceptable, not as a reason to reject
fairness principles. At most, Kaplow and Shavell have shown that a social
welfare function cannot simultaneously comply with the Pareto principle,
incorporate fairness principles, and exhibit their particular continuity
feature. If we must reject one of these three features of a social welfare
function, however, then we may regard this continuity as the least important
of these features. Kaplow and Shavell could have, with equal accuracy,
declared their result to be that any “ non-individualistic” social welfare
function must violate their continuity assumption, but such a result would
not be very provocative.
Indeed, any theory based on lexical priority will feature the general
type of discontinuity exhibited by F* and F**.196 These social welfare
functions are discontinuous precisely because they give priority to one
principle (the Pareto principle, as embodied in the alienability of individual
rights to fairness) over another (the fairness criterion F). Thus, even a small
change in circumstances (in our example, in utility) can trigger application
of the higher-priority principle (the Pareto principle), which then overrides
rankings based on any lower-priority principles (like criterion F). This
discontinuity may seem strange to those who are accustomed to weighing
all values on a single scale, but those who believe that some values take
absolute priority over others should not find such discontinuities disturbing.
Continuity is a strong assumption that social choice theorists rarely impose
on social welfare functions.197
196. See BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 174, at 147 (noting that “ lexicographic
orderings . . . are precluded by the requirement of continuity” ).
197. A survey of the literature on social choice theory reveals few examples of theorists who
impose any continuity assumptions on social welfare functions. Chichilnisky, supra note 182, at
337 (“ The vast literature on Social Choice makes little use of the continuity properties of the
social aggregation rule.” ); see also Sen, supra note 9 (surveying the literature on social choice
theory). In this literature, theorists have used continuity assumptions to derive welfarist social
welfare functions. E.g., Eric Maskin, A Theorem on Utilitarianism, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 93, 94
(1978) (showing that a social welfare function must be utilitarian if it features several properties,
including a continuity property); Roberts, supra note 175, at 428 (showing that a social welfare
function must be welfarist if it satisfies various conditions, including a continuity condition).
Imposing continuity assumptions in conjunction with other conditions is often tantamount to
assuming that only welfarist theories are reasonable.
Chichilnisky defends her continuity assumption as “ natural,” arguing that “ it is desirable for
the social rule to be relatively insensitive to small changes in individual preferences” so that
“ mistakes in identifying preferences” are “ less crucial.” Chichilnisky, supra note 182, at 337.
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Kaplow and Shavell, however, do not rule out all types of
discontinuities. They require only that a social welfare function be
continuous in the consumption of some good, but even this particular
continuity condition is a strong assumption. It would rule out, for example,
giving any welfarist principle lexical priority over any other principle,
because an arbitrarily small Pareto improvement would override rankings
based on the lower-priority principle, which would create discontinuous
changes in rankings. This continuity assumption would preclude not only
the use of fairness considerations to break ties in an otherwise welfarist
theory but also the use of any principles as tiebreakers in a welfarist theory,
including welfarist principles. That is, the continuity assumption would
even rule out a large class of purely welfarist theories.198 Most important for
our purposes, Kaplow and Shavell’s continuity assumption rules out
alienable rights to fairness, which in effect give the Pareto principle lexical
priority over fairness principles. Such a system of alienable rights would
violate this continuity assumption because even a small change in the
consumption of some good can be sufficient to create a Pareto improvement
that induces all individuals to waive their rights to the “ fair” alternative.
Given that this continuity assumption rules out many plausible moral
This pragmatic defense of continuity, however, lacks force as a reason to impose a restriction on
our ideal social welfare function, which indicates what welfare we would assign to each
alternative under conditions of complete information. We must first establish what welfare we
would assign under such ideal conditions before we decide what policy is the optimal response to
the constraints imposed by imperfect information. Unless we establish our ideal objective first, we
cannot decide how we can best pursue that ideal imperfectly in practice. Both F* and F**, for
example, are sensitive to small changes precisely because such small changes may determine
whether parties agree to waive their rights. If our moral ideal takes rights seriously in this way,
then it is entirely appropriate that we attach such importance to discovering the truth regarding the
parties’ preferences, and it is inappropriate to pretend that this information is insignificant.
198. It would, for example, rule out a utilitarian theory that first applied the criterion of
average utility to rank alternatives and then applied the criterion of total utility as a tiebreaker
when the principle of average utility yields a tie. Suppose two states y and z yield the same
average level of utility, but state y features a larger population, so that y yields greater total utility
than z. Our tiebreaking rule would rank y higher than z. Now consider a third state x, which is just
like z, except it includes a slightly higher level of consumption of some good and thus yields a
slightly higher level of utility for each individual in z. Our hypothetical theory would rank x above
not only z but also y, no matter how small the increase in average utility in x over z, in violation of
Kaplow and Shavell’s continuity assumption.
As another example, consider the “ lexical difference principle” proposed by Rawls. RAWLS,
supra note 53, at 83. Sen applies this principle to individual utilities and refers to the result as the
“ leximin” rule. Sen, supra note 9, at 1115-21. This rule first ranks states according to the utility
of the worst-off individual. If that individual is indifferent among some states, this rule then ranks
those states according to the utility of the second-worst-off individual, and so forth. The leximin
rule also violates Kaplow and Shavell’s continuity assumption. Consider a society with two
individuals and two states y and z. Suppose the worst-off person is indifferent between these two
states, but the best-off person prefers y over z. The leximin rule will rank y higher than z. Now
consider a third state x, which is just like z except that a slightly higher level of consumption of
some good produces a slight increase in utility for each individual. The leximin rule will rank x
higher than not only z but also y, no matter how small the increase in utility in x over z. Thus,
Kaplow and Shavell’s continuity assumption implies that “ their real quarry is much broader” than
their focus on fairness principles would suggest. Fried, supra note 69, at 39.
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theories, Kaplow and Shavell bear a heavy burden in justifying their use of
this assumption.199
B. Independence
Both F* and F** violate another condition that a utilitarian social
welfare function would satisfy. We might call the following restriction the
“ independence” condition: The social ranking of any pair of alternatives
must be the same as long as the individual utility and fairness (F)
information about the pair remains the same.200 We might view this
condition as an analogue of the “ independence of irrelevant alternatives”
condition that Kenneth Arrow used to prove his famous impossibility
theorem.201
To see how both F* and F** violate this condition, consider the
problem of ranking two alternatives x and y that cannot be ranked by the
Pareto principle. In general, we cannot rank these two alternatives without
information about the other alternatives in set S. We cannot, for example,
simply apply criterion F to rank the two outcomes unless one of the
alternatives is the unique optimum under criterion F, in which case the
fairness optimum is socially preferable. To apply criterion F mechanically
when ranking any pair of alternatives that cannot be ranked by the Pareto
principle might generate a preference cycle when combined with the Pareto
principle. For example, x may rank higher than y according to criterion F,
but y may be Pareto superior to a third alternative z, which in turn may rank
higher than x according to criterion F. By assumption, criterion F may rank
z higher than y even though y Pareto-dominates z. If neither x nor z Paretodominates the other, then our proposed simple decision rule would generate
a preference cycle. If our social welfare function is to operate over an
unrestricted domain, it cannot use such a simple rule to rank alternatives.202
199. See Fried, supra note 69, at 21-32 (questioning Kaplow and Shavell’s continuity
assumption).
200. I use the term “ fairness information” here to refer to the information necessary to rank
alternatives under criterion F.
201. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 26 (2d ed. 1963).
Others have since restated Arrow’s formal condition in informal terms similar to those used in our
independence condition. E.g., ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW’S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF
SOCIAL CHOICE 8 (1980) (“ This requires that the social ordering of a given set of alternatives
depend only on the individuals’ preference orderings of those alternatives.” ); MUELLER, supra
note 139, at 386 (“ The social choice between any two alternatives must depend only on the
orderings of individuals over these two alternatives, and not on their orderings over other
alternatives.” ); Sen, supra note 10, at 539 (“ The social ranking of any pair of states must be the
same as long as the individual utility information about the pair remains the same . . . .” ). Our
condition is more general in that it allows the use of more information in ranking a pair of
alternatives.
202. In her critique of Kaplow and Shavell, Fried also notes that combining fairness
principles with the Pareto principle can produce conflicts with the requirement of transitivity.
Fried, supra note 69, at 20-21, 33-35. Fried proposes to solve this problem by ruling out any
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Instead, under either F* or F**, one could only use criterion F to rank
x provisionally higher than y. Alternative x would enjoy a rebuttable
presumption of higher social welfare, but a proponent of alternative y could
rebut, for example, by showing that y Pareto-dominates z, which is not
Pareto inferior to x and which ranks higher than x according to criterion F.
Upon this showing, both z (by criterion F) and y (by the Pareto principle
and by transitivity) would rank higher than x, at least provisionally, subject
to further rebuttal by a proponent of x, for example, based on a similar
showing with respect to some other alternative that is Pareto inferior to x.
Thus, one could not conclusively rank alternatives x and y without knowing
at least the features of all alternatives Pareto inferior to either x or y. This
information requirement violates our independence condition.
Should this violation disturb us? Arrow defends the “ reasonableness”
of his own independence condition as an axiom that ensures that the
ranking of alternatives x and y are independent of the existence of other
alternatives like z in our example.203 He would rule out, for example, a
voting procedure in which the ranking of two candidates changes when a
third candidate is deleted from the ranks of the candidates. Instead, “ the
system applied to the remaining candidates should yield the same result.” 204
Thus, perhaps the independence condition is appealing because we do not
want the rankings of feasible alternatives to change as other alternatives
join or leave the feasible set.
A violation of the independence condition may sound odd in the
abstract, but a concrete example may make such a violation seem
reasonable and illustrate why such a violation would be necessary to
maintain compliance with the Pareto principle. Consider Sen’s example and
assume that F is the liberal consequentialism outlined in Part I. Consider
the problem of ranking alternatives p, in which only P reads the book, and
o, in which no one reads the book. Neither alternative is Pareto superior to
the other, because P has a personal preference for o, and L has an external
preference for p, so the Pareto principle cannot rank these alternatives.
Under the liberal principle F, we would rank o higher than p, because P’s
personal preference is not to read the book. If these two states were the only
feasible alternatives, then we could simply choose o accordingly. Suppose,
for example, that no version of the book exists in a language that L can
read, so that l, in which only L reads the book, is not a feasible alternative.
Suppose, however, that L discovers a dictionary that would enable L to
translate the book, making l a feasible alternative. If we are to avoid Sen’s
preference cycle, then we cannot continue to rank o over p once we
preferences that produce conflicts between the Pareto principle and fairness principles. Id. at 3536. The solution that I propose solves the same problem without ruling out such preferences.
203. ARROW, supra note 201, at 27.
204. Id.
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introduce l as a feasible alternative, for l would then rank higher than o
under principle F, because L’s personal preference is to read the book. The
Pareto principle, however, would rank p higher than l, because L and P
have such intense external preferences that they unanimously prefer p over
l, which completes Sen’s strict preference cycle.
Under either F* or F**, we choose to break this preference cycle in the
same way that Gibbard breaks it: We rank p as the optimum among the
three alternatives and thus rank p over o, reversing the ranking that applies
in the absence of l as a feasible alternative. Following the Pareto principle,
we rank p higher than l, which in turn ranks higher than o under criterion F,
because L prefers to read the book. Under Gibbard’s scheme of alienable
rights, L and P both agree to waive their rights because they see that the
exercise of their libertarian rights would produce outcome l, which no one
prefers over p. Under either system of alienable rights, the feasibility of l
becomes morally relevant to the ranking of o and p, because P would
choose to waive his right to o over p only if l is in fact available as an
alternative. The threat of l as a social choice is what leads P to waive his
right, and this threat is credible only if l is feasible.
Gibbard’s solution to Sen’s problem also violates the independence
condition, because in deciding whether to waive libertarian rights, each
party needs to know how other parties would choose to exercise their rights.
One cannot determine the ranking of two alternatives (like o and p) without
knowing the parties’ preferences regarding other alternatives (like l). Thus,
“ the outcome of the choice process is not independent of the set of feasible
alternatives,” and if “ the outcome represents the just social state, then
justice becomes a relative concept (i.e. relative to the set of feasible
alternatives).” 205 If we believe that our social welfare function must respect
these types of preferences to waive rights, then we cannot accept the
independence condition as a constraint on the social welfare function. Sen’s
example shows that any solution to Sen’s problem that uses the liberal
principle to rank alternatives as a general matter but gives priority to the
Pareto principle must violate our independence condition over an
unrestricted domain.
Given the sweeping effects of the independence condition, should we
consider it an essential feature of a social welfare function? It is certainly a
stronger assumption than the Pareto principle. Independence conditions
have been controversial as restrictions on social welfare functions. Of all
Arrow’s axioms, for example, his “ independence of irrelevant alternatives
has been the subject of the most discussion and criticism.” 206 Many have

205. Karni, supra note 132, at 573 (emphasis omitted).
206. MUELLER, supra note 139, at 393; see also MACKAY, supra note 201, at 48 (describing
Arrow’s independence condition as “ the most controversial of the lot” ).
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found the relaxation of this “ much debated condition” to be “ an appealing
way” of escaping Arrow’s impossibility result.207 Alfred MacKay, for
example, has suggested that the assumption that “ in socially ranking any
pair of candidates a device cannot respond to information about other
candidates” is a condition that “ does not appear to have much intrinsically
to recommend it,” so that if it has “ undesirable side effects,” we could
dispense with it “ without much regret.” 208 Sacrificing the independence
condition may be a more attractive option than sacrificing either the Pareto
principle or liberal principles.
Perhaps the objection to a social welfare function that violates the
independence condition is pragmatic. For example, Arrow cites “ a strong
practical advantage” in defense of his own independence condition.209 A
system that allows us to rank x and y without knowing information on the
rest of the agenda “ has an appealing economy to it.” 210 It would be a
complex task to use a function like F* or F** to rank any pair of
alternatives, because one may have to generate a ranking of many
alternatives in order to rank those two alternatives. Fortunately, in order to
make social choices under either F* or F**, we do not have to rank
arbitrary pairs of alternatives. To make such a choice, we could use a
simpler procedure than the procedure necessary to rank all alternatives in
set S. For example, under F* we would use the following procedure:
(1) Identify the alternatives in set S that are optimal under F. If any of
these “ fair” alternatives are also Pareto optimal, then these Pareto optimal
alternatives constitute set A and are our optimal social choices.
(2) If none of these alternatives are Pareto optimal, then we eliminate
any “ fair” alternative that is Pareto inferior to any other “ fair” alternative.
The remaining “ fair” alternatives constitute set C.
(3) Identify all alternatives that are Pareto superior to at least one of the
alternatives in set C. This set of Pareto superior alternatives would
constitute set B and would include our optimal social choices. To identify
the optimal choices within set B, repeat steps (1) through (3) for set B. That
is, apply the same steps to set B that we applied to set S. Continue this
procedure until a “ fair” alternative is also Pareto optimal. Choose such an
alternative as a social optimum.

207. Sen, supra note 1, at 156.
208. MACKAY, supra note 201, at 92-93.
209. ARROW, supra note 201, at 110.
210. MUELLER, supra note 139, at 394. Mueller stresses that social choice processes that
violate Arrow’s condition might be subject to “ abuse” or “ strategic misrepresentation of
preferences.” Id. at 395. Similarly, MacKay notes that Arrow’s condition requires a social welfare
function to use only information that can be “ reliably ascertained” and avoids “ strategic
manipulation” of the social choice system. MACKAY, supra note 201, at 36.
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We can describe a similar procedure under F**.211 Even these
procedures, however, might be cumbersome if set S includes a large
number of alternatives. The difficulty of finding the optimum under F* or
F** in practice, however, is beside the point. Conditions of “ computational
convenience and simplicity” address pragmatic considerations that are not
directly relevant to the issue of moral philosophy that is at stake.212 I present
F* and F** simply to demonstrate that a social welfare function can, in
theory, incorporate fairness concerns without violating the Pareto principle
or otherwise generating preference cycles. A theoretical counterexample is
sufficient to disprove the logical impossibility of constructing such a social
welfare function. This procedure addresses the ethical question of what
function we ought to maximize ideally, not the pragmatic question of how
we might maximize that function imperfectly in practice, given the
constraints imposed by the costliness of gathering and processing
information.
In reality, the identification and analysis of alternatives requires an
investment of scarce resources. We must devote resources, for example, to
the analysis of the consequences of different policies. We must also bear
costs to gather information on individual preferences regarding these
consequences. The allocation of these scarce resources for policy analysis is
itself a social choice subject to normative analysis. Thus, practical
considerations militate in favor of a simplified procedure for policy
analysis.
From a practical standpoint, it is likely that a reasonable rule of thumb
for making social choices under F* or F** would be simply to choose the
optimum under our second-best criterion F, unless we can readily identify a
Pareto improvement over that optimum. Suppose, for example, that F is the
liberal consequentialism outlined in Part I. We would in general expect to
identify a unique optimum under that F.213 Everyone would enjoy an
entitlement to this fairness optimum, which would itself include the
procedure necessary to identify the optimal social choices. Deviations from
this optimum would be justified under F* or F** only if all individuals
prefer another alternative. Given the costs of finding such a Pareto superior

211. We would first identify the alternatives that are optimal under F. Second, if there is
more than one optimum, then we would apply a welfarist principle to rank the fairness optima and
to identify a smaller subset of optima. If any of these optima are also Pareto optimal, then declare
these alternatives to be our optimal social choices, much as F* would choose an alternative in set
A. If none are Pareto optimal, then this subset corresponds to set C under F*. Move all alternatives
that Pareto-dominate at least one of these alternatives in this subset to a higher ranking set,
corresponding to set B under F*, and repeat the entire procedure on this Pareto superior set.
Continue these iterations until an optimum is also Pareto optimal.
212. Kelly, supra note 132, at 139.
213. The probability of an exact tie for the optimum is virtually zero.
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alternative in the real world, we may expect it to be rarely worth investing
much of our scarce resources in the search for such Pareto improvements.
We may expect a limited investment of resources to be unlikely to
identify a Pareto improvement. At best, we might identify a limited set of
possible Pareto improvements, but given the costs of discovering the
preferences of each individual in the world, we would be uncertain whether
any given candidate for a Pareto improvement is in fact Pareto superior to
the fairness optimum. As the number of individuals in the world increases,
it becomes increasingly unlikely that any given candidate is Pareto superior
to the fairness optimum in reality. After all, for such an alternative to
Pareto-dominate the fairness optimum, everyone must prefer this alternative
over the fairness optimum (under the weak Pareto principle) or no one must
prefer the fairness optimum over this alternative (under the strong Pareto
principle). Given the low probability of actually choosing a Pareto
improvement, the selection of some alternative other than the fairness
optimum is likely to decrease social welfare under F* or F**.
Almost certainly at least one person in the world will prefer the fairness
optimum over any other alternative that we can readily identify. First, given
the diversity of moral views in the world, at least one person is likely to
believe in criterion F as a fairness principle and thus prefer our fairness
optimum over other alternatives on moral grounds. As long as we include
moral preferences in our definition of the Pareto principle, these
alternatives will not be Pareto superior to our fairness optimum. Second,
even if we were to exclude moral preferences from our definition of the
Pareto principle, it would still seem unlikely that we could readily identify a
Pareto improvement over our fairness optimum, as long as our fairness
principles tend to promote human welfare. The more unlikely criterion F is
to rank a Pareto inferior alternative over a Pareto superior alternative, the
more difficult it will be to find a Pareto improvement over the fairness
optimum. Thus, as long as our fairness principles are likely to make
someone somewhere better off when applied, as any reasonable fairness
theory would, then anyone who seeks to maximize either F* or F** is
likely to make the same social choices in practice as someone who seeks to
maximize F.
Therefore, the difficulty of maximizing a more complex social welfare
function like F* or F** may simply militate in favor of maximizing F
instead as a less costly procedure that comes as close to maximizing the
ideal function as we can in the real world. That is, in making social choices,
we might use criterion F as a reasonable proxy for the type of ideal social
welfare function proposed here, departing from criterion F only in those
unusual circumstances when we can identify a Pareto improvement over the
fairness optimum. If we are unlikely to identify an alternative Pareto
superior to the alternative that appears optimal under criterion F, we may in
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general use criterion F as the second-best rule that we apply in practice to
make social choices.
Kaplow and Shavell assert that it is “ simply irrelevant . . . that Pareto
dominance will be rare among actual policy alternatives,” because their
point is that “ the Pareto principle not only rules out choice of Paretodominated policies; it also renders inadmissible certain criteria for assessing
policy.” 214 My response takes seriously the theoretical significance of the
Pareto principle for the question of the “ criteria for assessing policy” but
proposes ideal social welfare functions that not only incorporate fairness
criteria but also comply with the Pareto principle. The fact that “ Pareto
dominance will be rare” is relevant, however, to whether we should make
social choices using cruder fairness principles in practice as an imperfect
but reasonable approximation of the choices we would make using the ideal
social welfare function.
Furthermore, even if we can commonly and easily identify Pareto
improvements over the fairness optimum under criterion F, a belief in either
F* or F** as the ideal criterion for social choice would still make the
evaluation of policies under criterion F morally relevant. We would need to
apply criterion F to determine the entitlements that we would allow
individuals either to enjoy or to alienate. Thus, the maximization of either
F* or F** would preserve an important role for fairness principles in
practice, because criterion F would specify what rights individuals can
invoke to trump welfarist concerns. This analysis under fairness principles
would be an essential first step in the identification of the optimal social
choice under either F* or F**.
In contrast, the identification of the optimum under welfarist criteria
would be morally irrelevant. The welfarist optimum could possibly coincide
with the social optimum under F* or F** in some cases, but we could not
count on such a coincidence. In fact, pursuit of the welfarist optimum could
lead us seriously astray and could easily produce outcomes that rank lower
under either F* or F** than the fairness optimum identified by criterion F.
On those occasions when the welfarist optimum does rank higher under F*
or F** than does the fairness optimum under F, it will do so by virtue of
Pareto superiority, not by any other application of welfarist analysis. Under
F*, we would have no need to apply welfarist criteria in the evaluation of
policy alternatives, except to identify Pareto improvements. Thus, a belief
in F* leaves us with good reasons to concern ourselves with fairness
principles and no reason at all to heed welfarist analysis beyond the
application of the Pareto principle. Similarly, a belief in F** gives fairness
principles priority over welfarism, except for the application of the Pareto
principle.
214. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 4.
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C. A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare
I have suggested that the liberal consequentialism described in Part I is
a plausible candidate for a second-best fairness principle F, but it is not my
objective in this Article to defend either F* or F** as the ideal social
welfare function derived from that F. If we were to adopt that
consequentialism as our principle F, then liberal principles might call for
more frequent departures from F than those suggested by the weak Pareto
principle alone. For example, we might substitute the strong Pareto
principle for the weak Pareto principle, or we might want to depart from
criterion F in other circumstances when all those individuals with standing
to complain about an alternative nevertheless favor that alternative.
For example, all those who would suffer under a particular alternative
in terms of their personal preferences may nevertheless favor that
alternative on the basis of their external preferences. In Sen’s example, P
and L prefer p over l on this basis. Alternative p might fail as a Pareto
improvement, however, if those whose personal preferences are unaffected
by that alternative exercise a veto based on their external preferences.
Consider the political preferences of some third party added to Sen’s
example, who may veto p based on a belief in the type of liberalism
proposed by Sen. If this veto implies that we must apply the liberal
consequentialism described in Part I, then the veto would prevent P and L
from waiving their rights, because, under that criterion F, the alternative
that interferes with the satisfaction of personal preferences (p) would rank
lower than the alternative that satisfies those preferences (l).
Should the trade that produces p go forward despite the objections of
some based on their external preferences? Those who object may argue that
those who favor the trade do so on the basis of external preferences and
thus forfeit any right to have external preferences excluded from a
calculation of the welfare effects of the trade. Both the proponents and the
opponents of the trade base their positions on external preferences rather
than personal preferences. The opponents of the trade would claim that their
external preferences should receive just as much weight as the external
preferences satisfied by alternative p. If we give all preferences equal
weight in these cases, we would allow such trades to go forward only if
they increase a measure of welfare that includes the satisfaction of all
external preferences as well as personal preferences. This welfarist
qualification would also prevent a series of such trades from producing a
strict preference cycle, because if they go forward only when they increase
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this measure of welfare, then a series of these trades cannot lead back to the
origin.215
A Pareto improvement would be a special case of such a trade, an
example that all individuals prefer. We could depart from criterion F not
only to implement Pareto improvements but also to permit any other
transaction that is both an improvement from the standpoint of welfarism
and favored by all who would suffer in terms of their personal preferences.
We might consider any such transaction or any series of such transactions
to be a social improvement. To implement this qualification in a social
welfare function, we would follow a procedure like that used to produce F*
or F**, but we would substitute this more general notion of a social
improvement for the more specific notion of a Pareto improvement.
My goal, however, has not been to identify the ideal social welfare
function. I have merely sought to show that the Pareto principle does not by
itself end the search for a fair or liberal social welfare function. On the
contrary, reconciliation with the Pareto principle may simply be the first
and most obvious refinement we would want to make in developing a social
welfare function based on liberal principles.
This search for the ideal conception of social welfare is an example of
the pursuit of what Rawls calls “ reflective equilibrium,” which one reaches
“ after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions,” seeking those
“ that match our considered judgements,” and “ has either revised his
judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial
convictions.” 216 I mean to suggest that the type of liberal theory of social
welfare sketched here may “ give a better match with our considered
judgments on reflection” 217 than the welfarism proposed by Kaplow and
Shavell, which rejects all notions of fairness. In our pursuit of reflective
equilibrium, we may more easily sacrifice features like independence and
continuity in our social welfare function than fairness principles or the
Pareto principle.218 In deciding whether independence and continuity are

215. As Gibbard points out, libertarian rights may be inconsistent with one another, and we
have to qualify these rights in some way to ensure a system of rights that is consistent with itself,
even before we consider the conflict between these rights and the Pareto principle. Gibbard, supra
note 120, at 388-97. Given that “ [t]he problem of internal consistency of the kind with which
Gibbard is concerned arises only with preference configurations requiring rather other-oriented
motivations,” Sen agrees that “ the weakening of these ‘rights’ in the presence of other-oriented
motivations would not seem to involve any great violations of libertarianism.” Sen, supra note 2,
at 235. Christian Seidl explores the necessary conditions for liberalism, which he takes to
be a system that allows any “ coalition” to do what it wants such that “ the joint outcome can
actually be put into action.” Christian Seidl, On Liberal Values, 35 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
NATIONALÖKONOMIE 257, 279 (1975).
216. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 48.
217. Id. at 50.
218. Any Paretian social welfare function that incorporates fairness notions must violate
independence or continuity conditions or both over an unrestricted domain. See Roberts, supra
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necessary conditions for a plausible social welfare function, we must
consult our moral intuitions. Given the defects of welfarism as a moral
theory, we may find that a fairness theory on balance yields a better fit with
our moral intuitions, and we might reasonably opt for the fairness theory. I
have outlined a solution that I suggest “ moves us closer to the
philosophical ideal,” but may not, “ of course, achieve it.” 219
V. CONCLUSION
I have shown that the Pareto principle by itself does not imply that we
must abandon principles of fairness, including principles of liberal
toleration. A theory of fairness can incorporate the Pareto principle, and
indeed can generate a complete ranking of alternatives, much as a utilitarian
social welfare function can. A fairness theory that complies with the Pareto
principle would never sacrifice the interests of all individuals and is thus
not vulnerable to the charge that it stands in opposition to human welfare.
Such a fairness theory would apply fairness principles only to resolve
conflicts between individuals, so that these principles would always serve
the interests of at least one person. Fairness principles under this theory
would address the just distribution of benefits and burdens in society.
I have not addressed precisely what principles a theory of fairness
should include. My goal in this Article has been merely to demonstrate that
a plausible theory can capture our strong moral intuitions regarding liberal
toleration and also respect the Pareto principle. Utilitarians need stronger
assumptions than the Pareto principle to preclude the incorporation of
fairness concerns in a social welfare function.

note 175, at 428 (showing that imposing independence and weak continuity conditions along with
the weak Pareto principle over an unrestricted domain implies a welfarist social welfare function).
219. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 50.

